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This Article takes the bursting of the dot com bubble as an opportunity to 
reevaluate the tax structure of venture capital startups.  By organizing startups as 
corporations rather than as partnerships, investors and entrepreneurs seem to leave 
money on the table by failing to fully use tax losses – e specially since the vast majority 
of startups fail.  Conventional wisdom attributes the lack of attention paid to losses to a 
“gambler’s mentality” or optimism bias.  I argue here that the use of the corporate form 
is, in fact, rational, or at least that there is a method to the madness.
I make four main points.  First, the tax losses are not as valuable as they might 
seem; tax rules prohibit many investors from capturing the full benefit of the losses.
Second, the VC professionals who structure the deals do not personally share in the 
losses, so they have little reason to care about the tax effects of the losses.  Third, gains 
are taxed more favorably if the startup is organized as a corporation from the outset, and 
again, this favorable treatment of gains is especially attractive to the VC professionals –
further evidence that agency costs may be playing a role here.  Fourth, corporations are 
less complex than partnerships: organizing as a corporation minimizes legal costs and 
simplifies employee compensation and exit strategy.
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THE RATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF 
STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL STARTUPS
Victor Fleischer1
The venture capital market imploded in 2001.  It was the worst year for VC 
investors in recent history – indeed, only the second year in the last thirty with four 
quarters of negative returns.2  With losses, not gains, now on everyone’s mind, this 
Article takes the bursting of the dot com bubble as an opportunity to reevaluate the tax 
structure of venture capital startups.  Prior commentators have pointed out that venture 
capital startups are structured in a tax-inefficient manner, particularly regarding losses.3
A typical startup is organized as a corporation under state law, which means that it is 
treated as a separate entity from its owners for tax purposes.4  If a startup were instead 
organized as a partnership or limited liability company (LLC), it could elect 
“passthrough” treatment for tax purposes.5  The gains or (more likely) the losses of the 
new business would flow through to the investors, with each investor recognizing its 
share of taxable income or loss.6  A startup’s tax losses are potentially very valuable to 
certain investors.7  Because a startup is typically organized as a corporation, however, its 
1
 Acting Professor of Law, UCLA Law School.  Comments are welcomed and should be directed to the 
author at (310) 825-6690 or by email at fleischer@law.ucla.edu.  I am most grateful for the helpful 
comments on this paper from my generous friends and colleagues in practice and in academia, including 
Anne Alstott, Joseph Bankman, Matt Bodie, Andy Berg, Mel Eisenberg, Bill Gentry, Bill Gifford, Ron 
Gilson, Vic Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Steve Hall, Sang Ji, Calvin Johnson, Avery Katz, Stewart Karlinsky, 
Elliott Manning, Marty McMahon, David Schizer, Larry Zelenak, and for the comments and questions of 
participants at various job talks and workshops, including the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Series, the 
Tax Policy Colloquium at Penn, and the Mid-year Meeting of the American Taxation Association.  
2
 See “Value of Investments in Venture Capital Continues to Decline,” Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at C13. 
The average portfolio lost 28 percent of its value; the average early stage portfolio, 34 percent.  See Robert 
Clow, “VC Returns Down in 2001,” Financial Times, June 11, 2002, at P31.
3
 See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1737, 1738 (1994) 
(hereinafter Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups).
4 See §§ 11, 7701.  Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations herein are to the Internal Revenue Code.
5
 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, - 3 (check-the-box rules).
6
 See §§ 701, 704 (passthrough treatment of partnerships).
7
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1738 (“The unfavorable tax treatment … gives the 
newly-formed corporation an after-tax return on investment that is considerably less than that realized by 
the partnership or established company.”).  Professor Bankman focuses on Silicon Valley startups in 
particular rather than venture capital startups generally.  I have not observed any relevant distinctions 
between the organizational choices of startups in New York, where I practiced, and Silicon Valley.  For a 
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tax losses get trapped at the entity level and can only be carried forward as a net 
operating loss (NOL), which is less valuable.8  Lawyers who advise venture capital 
professionals understand the tax effects of structuring a startup as a corporation.  The 
corporate law differences between a limited liability company and a privately-held 
corporation are relatively minor.9  Why, then, do nearly all startups choose the seemingly 
less tax-efficient structure?  Should post-bubble deal planners revise the standard deal 
structure to better account for losses?
Conventional wisdom attributes the choice of deal structure to a kind of irrational 
exuberance.  People are foolishly biased towards thinking about gains, not losses.10
Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, dreaming of gains, discount the value of tax losses 
generated by a startup.11  In an important 1994 Article, The Structure of Silicon Valley 
Start-Ups, Professor Joseph Bankman described these people as suffering from a 
“gambler’s mentality” which leads them to overestimate their likelihood of success.12
discussion of regional differences and their impact on the venture capital industry, see AnnaLee Saxenian, 
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
8
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1743-44.  
9
 See discussion at infra text accompanying notes 128-136.
10
 The phrase “irrational exuberance” is borrowed, of course, from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan’s famous speech to the American Enterprise Institute on December 5, 1996.  See 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm (last visited August 30, 2002) 
(“But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become 
subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?”). 
11
 Bankman noted a lack of interest in tax losses both among potential limited partner investors, see 
Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1759-63, and among the entrepreneurs and VCs, see id.
at 1764-65.  Bankman also emphasized the general lack of tax sophistication among VC professionals.  See 
id. at 1747 (“… perhaps the most surprising aspect of [executives and venture capitalists] was the relative
lack of awareness of or interest in the tax consequences of the organization structure they had chosen.”).
12
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1764-66 (explaining that “the most common 
explanation for the industry structure” is that “[a]ttention to tax benefits from early losses runs counter to 
the expansive mind-set of inventors and venture capitalists.  ‘By their very nature,’ one lobbyist stated, ‘the 
kinds of people going into these things are very optimistic people[.]’”).  To be fair, Professor Bankman did 
not accept “gambler’s mentality” as the primary explanation for the lack of attention to tax losses, but 
rather saw it as contributing to the collective action problem that makes tax losses (and, in his view, a more 
rational and efficient tax structure) a “hard sell.”  See id.  In the years since Professor Bankman’s article, 
other commentators have picked up the theme that the structuring decision is irrational.  See Daniel S. 
Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-up: The Myth of Incorporation, 55 Tax Lawyer 923, 
924 (2002) (“This article asserts that advisors who advise immediate incorporation are relying largely on 
myths that the corporation, rather than the LLC, is the more desirable entity for a start-up seeking venture 
capital funding.”).
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Like blackjack players on their way to Las Vegas, they refuse to even think about losses, 
and they are hardly willing to plan the adventure with losses in mind.13
This Article argues that even in the post-bubble era the exuberance of venture 
capital deal planners is rational, or, at least, that there is a method to the madness.  There 
is surely some truth in the observation that startups are organized in a tax-inefficient 
manner:  partnerships are, on paper, more tax-efficient than corporations.14  But various 
“frictions” – non-tax business costs such as transaction costs, information problems, 
reputational concerns, and adverse accounting treatment – currently prevent deal planners 
from using the theoretically tax-favorable form.15  If these frictions wear down over time, 
we may well see more startups organized as partnerships.  But for now I think it is a 
mistake to conclude that startups are organized irrationally, or to accept the conventional 
wisdom that a casino mentality or some other cognitive bias explains the behavior of deal 
planners.  
I make four main points.  First, the tax losses are not as valuable as they might 
seem; tax rules prohibit many investors from capturing the full benefit of the losses.
Second, the VC professionals who structure the deals do not personally share in the 
losses, so they have little reason to care about the tax effects of the losses.  Third, gains 
are taxed more favorably if the startup is organized as a corporation from the outset, and 
again, this favorable treatment of gains is especially attractive to the VC professionals –
13
 See SWINGERS (screenplay by Jon Favreau, 1997) (Mike: “Do you think we’ll get there by midnight?” 
Trent: “Baby, we’ll be up five hunny [hundred] by midnight.”)
14
 There is a rich literature discussing the “corporate integration” question, with most commentators 
concluding that it would be wise to tax corporations and partnerships in a similar manner.  See generally 
American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project-Taxation of Private Business Enterprises (George K. 
Yin & David J. Shakow reps.) (1999); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 
Florida Tax Rev. 141, 150-154 (1999) (advocating a two-track integrated system of conduit taxation); 
Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
717, 736-38 (1981) (questioning fairness of double tax).  Most articles discussing the tax efficiency of 
partnerships focus on gains rather than losses and the effect of the second level of tax imposed at the entity 
level.  See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company:  A Catalyst for Exposing the 
Corporate Integration Question, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 393, 395 (1996) (explaining partnership advantage of one 
level of tax on gains).  Professor Bankman’s article is one of only a few articles, outside the context of 
discussing abusive tax shelters, to focus on the tax inefficiency caused by the corporate form’s trapping of 
losses.
15
 For a discussion of the concept of frictions, see generally Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson et al., 
TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 107-18 (2d ed. 2002) (describing how frictions 
restrict tax arbitrage); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 
1312, 1315-17 (2001) (explaining concept of using frictions such as high transaction costs, adverse 
financial accounting, or unappealing regulatory treatment to constrain abusive tax planning). 
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further evidence that agency costs may be playing a role here.  Fourth, corporations are 
less complex than partnerships: organizing as a corporation minimizes legal costs and 
simplifies employee compensation and exit strategy.
This Article makes two contributions to the existing academic literature.16  First, I 
present a solution to the puzzle of why startups are structured as corporations, showing 
how agency costs, transaction costs, and the practical application of some key tax rules 
impact the structuring decision in ways not considered by prior commentators.  Second, 
this Article calls attention to the value of seeking out rational explanations before 
accepting irrational ones – especially when analyzing the behavior of sophisticated 
experts.  In recent years, the legal academy has increasingly focused on cognitive biases 
and has drawn on the growing scholarship in the field of behavioral economics.17
Although Professor Bankman’s article predates the recent cascade of behavioral law and 
economics papers, a significant portion of his explanation of venture capital organization 
correlates with the “optimism bias” concept found in the behavioral literature – the 
phenomenon that people tend to overestimate their abilities and likelihood of success.18
16
 The existing literature on this topic is quite thin.  Other than Professor Bankman’s article, most tax 
articles discussing the structuring of startups are written by practitioners, focus on narrow issues, and tend 
to accept the use of the corporate form for startups as a given.  See Thomas A. Humphreys & Nizam M. 
Siddiq, Tax Considerations for Venture Capital and Technology-Related Start-Ups, 477 PLI / Tax 747, 757 
(2000) (briefly describing advantages of corporate form as including simplicity and protecting tax-exempt 
and foreign investors from flowthrough consequences); Armando Gomez, Selected Issues Relating to 
Domestic and Foreign Technology Start-Ups and Joint Ventures, 498 PLI / Tax 975, 987 (2001) (noting 
that public companies are taxed as C Corporations, that only corporations may be acquired in tax-free 
reorganizations under § 368, and that only corporations may use incentive stock options under § 421);  
Ellen B. Corenswet, Formation and Financing of Internet Start-ups, 610 PLI / Pat 489 (2000) (explaining 
that VCs traditionally prefer C Corps, but that friends and family or angel investors might prefer LLCs).  
Other articles focus on corporate law rather than tax law.  See also J. William Callison, Venture Capital and 
Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 
26 J. Corp. L. 97, 108 (2000) (focusing on non-tax issues and attributing preference for corporations to lack 
of role differentiation between owners and managers under default LLC statutes). 
17
 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1251, 1258 (2001) 
(describing “cascade” effect with respect to behavioral economics literature); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 
640-687 (surveying behavioral law and economics literature) (1999); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476-80 (1998) (providing overview 
of behavioral law and economics approach).  
18
 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 18, at 654-58 (surveying optimism bias literature); Jon D. Hanson & 
Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 
Yale L.J. 1163, 1186-88 (1998) (describing third-person effect bias, i.e., assumption that bad things happen 
to other people); Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 71, 91 (2002) (describing effect of optimistic bias on behavior of defined contribution plan 
participants); William Meadow & Cass Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 Duke L.J. 629, 639-640 (2001) 
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While the psychological phenomenon of optimism bias may be part of the story here, this 
Article shows that there is much more to it.  Sophisticated actors who are unaffected by 
optimism bias – or whose optimism was crushed by the recent bear market – would 
rationally make the same organizational choice as the stereotypical Silicon Valley VC 
afflicted with rose-tinted vision.  The broader point is that cognitive biases, though 
sometimes enlightening, should be used as a last resort rather than as a primary or all-
purpose explanation for seemingly irrational behavior.  If identifying these biases keep us 
from rigorously testing rational explanations, we may sometimes miss the subtle yet 
important details that can help account for the behavior of sophisticated actors in a 
complex marketplace.19
This Article is divided into five short parts.  Part I explores the tax benefits of the 
partnership structure.  Part II describes various limits on taxpayers’ ability to use those 
tax benefits.  Part III considers agency costs and the advantages the corporate structure 
provides to entrepreneurs and VCs, especially with respect to the tax treatment of gains.  
Part IV compares the simplicity of the corporate structure with the relative complexity of 
the partnership structure.  Part V concludes.  
(discussing role of optimism bias in regulating doctor-patient relationship).  A Westlaw search of law 
review articles reveals 71 separate articles referring to “optimistic bias” or “optimism bias,” most of which 
appear in the last 3 years, and 65 of which postdate Professor Bankman’s 1994 article (search conducted 
August 30, 2002 in Westlaw’s JLR database).
19
 Details are especially important in considering the effects of tax rules, which are often easy for a 
layperson to misunderstand but nonetheless affect the behavior of well-advised parties, even if the parties 
themselves do not fully understand the rules and simply rely on the advice of counsel.
DRAFT of 8/7/03
7
I.  THE PUZZLE
Entrepreneurs are optimists.20  They believe that their ideas, like the children of 
Lake Wobegon, are all better than average.21  This cognitive bias leads to a heightened 
sense of confidence and control, blunting the perception of risk and masking the 
likelihood of failure.22  In a recent study, more than one-third of Silicon Valley engineers 
rated their performance among the top 5% of all engineers, and nearly 90% placed their 
performance in the top 25%.23  Given this cognitive bias, the gambler’s mentality of 
Silicon Valley would appear to be a plausible explanation for why startups are organized 
as corporations.  A behavioral law and economics approach would suggest that 
entrepreneurs and VCs are foolishly optimistic and should pay more attention to losses.24
As sober-minded and dispassionate lawyers, should we throw a wet blanket over this 
irrational exuberance?25
20
 A story of irrational exuberance would be consistent with much of the existing literature on the mindset 
of entrepreneurs. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 Chi-Kent 
L. Rev. 1569, 1584 (“[S]tart-up entrepreneurs are a well-studied breed, prone toward greater over-optimism 
and illusions of control than the general population.”); Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences 
Between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-
Making, 12 J. Bus. Venturing 9, 15 (1997); Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to 
Explain Entrepreneurial Risk Taking, 10 J. Bus. Venturing 425 (1995); Po Bronson, The Nudist on the Late 
Shift and Other True Tales of Silicon Valley (1999); STARTUP.COM (2001) (describing the rise and fall of 
govWorks.com). 
21
 Garrison Keillor famously ends his public radio show, A Prairie Home Companion, by saying goodbye 
from Lake Wobegon, where “the women are strong, the men are good-looking, and all the children are 
above average.”  See http://prairiehome.org (site last visited August 30, 2002)
22
 See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1583 (explaining cognitive bias of entrepreneurs); Busenitz & Barney, 
supra note 20, at 15.  
23
 See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289, 291 n.3, citing Todd R. 
Zenger, Compensating for the Innovation: Do Small Firms Offer High-Powered Incentives that Lure Talent 
and Motivate Effort?, John M. Olin School of Business Working Paper No. 96-24, 1996.
24
 See generally Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously, supra note 20, at 1585-87 (discussing lawyer’s 
ethical duty in the face of entrepreneurial over-optimism); Mark C. Suchman & Mia Cahill, The Hired Gun 
as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
679, 683 (1996) (describing Silicon Valley lawyers’ role in mitigating deal uncertainties); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for 
Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 1, 15 (1998) (discussing role of 
intermediaries in dealing with entrepreneurial over-optimism); Manuel Utset, Innovation & Governance 
(check cite).  Compare D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. Small & 
Emerging Bus. L. 133, 155 (1998) (expressing skepticism about gambler’s mentality as a significant 
explanation for entrepreneurial behavior); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Costs 
Engineer?, 74 Or. L. Rev. (1995).
25
 For an example of the wet blanket approach, see Goldberg, supra note 12 (debunking the “myths” that 
lead to choosing the C Corp Structure).
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In fact, while it may be true that entrepreneurs and VCs are overly optimistic, it 
does not necessarily follow that this cognitive bias drives the choice of organizational 
form.  Optimism in the venture capital industry can be a conversation-stopper, just as risk 
aversion can be improperly used as an intellectual crutch to explain institutional 
arrangements like hedging or insurance.26  If anything, recent data show a lack of 
correlation between optimism bias and deal structure:  post-bubble investors have 
displayed signs of pessimism, not optimism, and yet deal structures largely remain the 
same.27  Optimism bias is an unsatisfying explanation, and the importance of the puzzle –
millions of dollars of tax losses left on the table, year after year – warrants a closer 
look.28
A.  The Alternative Structures:  C Corp and Passthrough
Some numerical examples may help illustrate the importance of deal structure to 
the bottom line.  To analyze the fiscal consequences of organizing as a corporation rather 
than as a partnership, I will use two hypothetical startups, GainCorp, which begins its life 
as a C Corporation29 (the C Corp Structure), and LossLLC, which begins its life as an 
26
 See Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics, J. Inst. & Theor. 
Econ. 1989.
27
 The number of VC funds raised in 2001 dropped by 51%, and total capital commitments dropped by 
62%.  See 2002 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook (Thomson Financial & Venture 
Economics) at 10.  See also Lou Whiteman, “VCs Pessimistic, Dismiss Terrorism,” Daily Deal, Oct. 16, 
2001, at pin (“The outlook for startups is so bleak that even venture capitalists are dissuading entrepreneurs 
from seeking venture funding, according to a new study.”)
28
 Professor Bankman did explore other possible explanations in his article, noting that he found it troubling 
to discover that sophisticated investors were consistently choosing a bad deal structure, and it would be 
unfair to characterize his Article as a simple adoption of the gambler’s mentality view.  But I think it is fair 
to say that Bankman tended to focus on irrational explanations rather than rational ones, and that most of 
his Article tends to come back, one way or another, to cognitive bias.  See Bankman, Silicon Valley 
Startups, supra note 3, at 1747 (noting surprise at overall lack of tax awareness among executives and 
venture capitalists).  
Perhaps more importantly, subsequent commentators have fully embraced the irrational 
exuberance explanation.  See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 943 (“… stock options may be a means of 
attracting young high-tech but financially unsophisticated employees, ready to overvalue the options as 
compensation and therefore accept less cash compensation than the actual value of the options would 
warrant.  Perhaps this represents a real value of incorporating in the era of irrational exuberance.”)
29
 Most corporations are “C Corporations” because they are taxed under subchapter C of the tax Code, as 
distinguished from “S Corporations,” which are taxed under subchapter S.  Certain closely-held 
corporations may elect subshapter S treatment.  Unless otherwise noted, references in this Article to 
corporate tax treatment refer to C Corporations, not S Corporations.  S Corporations are not generally 
suitable for venture capital startups because of the restrictions on the types of shareholders permitted and 
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LLC30 (the Passthrough Structure).  Assume for now that each company is engaged in the 
same business, with the same caliber of talent and the same likelihood of success in the 
marketplace.
THE C CORP STRUCTURE
     GainCorp is organized as a Delaware corporation 
with two classes of stock: common stock and 
convertible participating preferred stock.  The 
founders and managers hold the common stock and 
options to buy common stock.  The VC Fund 
receives preferred stock, which may be converted 
into common stock in the event of a qualified IPO.
Entrepreneurs /
Management
Business Assets
THE PASSTHROUGH STRUCTURE
     LossLLC is organized as a Delaware limited 
liability company.  The VC Fund receives 100% of 
the capital interests in the LLC.  The founders and 
managers receive profits interests and partnership 
options. 
                                           VC professionals             LP Investors
Entrepreneurs /
Management
Business Assets
The economic deal struck among the parties is the same in both structures.31   The 
VC Fund, which itself is a partnership funded by limited partners (LP Investors, or LPs), 
on the way the economics of the deal can be allocated.  See § 1361(b)(1)(B) (only individuals and certain 
estates and trusts permitted as S Corp shareholders); § 1361(b)(1)(D) (only one class of stock permitted).
30
 The reader should note that although LLCs and limited partnerships differ in terms of governance and 
corporate law, each is normally treated as a partnership for tax purposes (i.e., as a passthrough entity), and 
when I refer to partnership tax treatment, the reference should be read to include the tax treatment of LLCs 
as well as partnerships.
31
 The deal structures of venture capital investments tend to look very much alike.  Although the economics 
of the investment vary greatly from deal to deal – valuations vary; sometimes VCs take a large stake in the 
VC Fund, LP
GainCorp, Inc.
Common 
Stock and 
Stock 
Options
Preferred 
Stock
VC Fund, LP
LossLLC
Profits 
Interests and 
Partnership 
Options
Capital 
Interests
LP InvestorsVC professionals
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invests in the startup.  In exchange, the VC Fund receives both downside protection and 
upside potential.32  But while the economic deal is the same, the tax consequences differ.  
GainCorp is treated as a separate taxpayer, while income or loss generated by LossLLC is 
passed through to its owners. 
Losses are the more important tax feature in the early years of the venture.  A 
startup’s tax losses are generated largely by two Code sections, § 195 and § 174.  Section 
195 requires startups to capitalize expenditures incurred in connection with creating a 
new business, but it allows taxpayers to elect to amortize those expenses over a relatively 
short five-year period.33  Section 174 goes further, allowing taxpayers to deduct “research 
and experimental” expenditures in the year in which they are incurred, even if the 
expenses are expected to produce a product with a long useful life, such as a patentable 
process or technology.34  The term “research and experimental” has been interpreted 
company, sometimes a small one; VCs receive a variety of liquidation preferences, dividend rates, 
conversion ratios, and so on – the form of the investment is usually the same.  The VC Fund’s investment 
usually takes the form of convertible preferred stock; the entrepreneur takes the common stock, often 
subject to vesting requirements, and may also receive stock options.  The Fund’s preferred stock investment 
takes place in several stages as the entrepreneur meets the goals set out in the business plan.  On the 
uniformity of VC deal structures, see Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, at 5 (forthcoming Harv. L. Rev.); Steven 
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of 
Venture Capital Contracts, National Bureau of Economic Affairs Working Paper No. 7660, at pin (2000). 
For an overview of the venture capital industry, see Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, THE VENTURE 
CAPITAL CYCLE (1999).  For sample documents, see Michael J. Halloran, Lee F. Benton, Robert V. 
Gunderson, Jr., Jorge del Calvo, & Benjamin M. Vandegrift, VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING 
NEGOTIATION (3d ed. 2002).
The discussion here is limited to venture capital, not private equity generally, as the structure of 
private equity investments varies to a greater extent.  See generally Andrew W. Needham, A Guide to Tax 
Planning for Private Equity Funds and Portfolio Investments, 94 Tax Notes 1215 (2002) (Part 1 of 2); 94 
Tax Notes 1381 (2002) (Part 2 of 2).
32
 On the downside, the VC Fund receives the right to the entire current liquidation value of the startup –
represented by preferred stock in GainCorp and by the capital interest in LossLLC.  See generally William 
W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
891, 897-901 (2002) (describing preferred stock arrangements regarding control).  On the upside, the VC 
Fund has the right to the first profits of the company and a share of profits beyond that – represented by 
liquidation preference and conversion rights written in to the terms of the preferred stock in the case of 
GainCorp, and liquidation and preference rights written in to the operating agreement in the case of 
LossLLC.
33
 See § 195.  In general, a capital expenditures is the cost of acquiring property that has a useful life 
extending beyond the close of the taxable year.  The cost is included in or added to the basis of the acquired 
property and either recovered over time through depreciation or amortization deductions or recovered when 
the property is sold.  See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 107 (7th ed. 1994).  
34
 See § 174.
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broadly to include the costs of salary, rent, and equipment associated with research.35
There is also a tax credit for research costs under § 41, which gives qualifying taxpayers 
a credit for 20% of their incremental increase in research expenses from prior years above 
a statutorily-calculated, taxpayer-specific, base amount.36 As a result of these Code 
sections, a startup will generate tax losses within five years that, when added together, 
nearly equal the amount of money originally contributed to the venture.37
The Passthrough Structure enables taxable LPs to take advantage of these tax 
losses.  The operating agreement of LossLLC allocates tax losses to the VC Fund, a 
limited partnership which is also a passthrough entity for tax purposes.38  The VC Fund’s 
partnership agreement then allocates tax losses to LPs in proportion to the amount of 
money each contributed at the start of the Fund.  The LPs realize the tax losses generated 
by LossLLC in the same year they were incurred and, subject to various restrictions 
discussed below, use those losses to offset other taxable income.  
The C Corp Structure, on the other hand, cannot take full advantage of tax losses 
generated by the startup.  As a corporation, GainCorp traps its tax losses at the entity 
level and carries them forward as a net operating loss (NOL).  The NOL might be used in 
future years to offset GainCorp’s taxable income.  Several conditions, however, limit the 
value of GainCorp’s NOL.  First, GainCorp might never become profitable, in which case 
it will never soak up its NOL.  Second, even if GainCorp does become profitable and 
uses the NOL, the value of the tax loss is diminished by the time value of money.  A tax 
loss tomorrow is worth less than a tax loss today.  Third, if there is a change in control in 
GainCorp, as often happens when, for example, a moderately successful startup is sold to 
35
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1741; Treas. Reg § 1.174-2(a)(1); Rev. Proc. 
2000-50 (setting forth guidelines pertaining to deduction of costs incurred to develop, purchase or lease 
computer software).
36
 See § 41.
37
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1743.
38
 Funds are now sometimes organized as LLCs.  Many funds, however, prefer to organize as limited 
partnerships.  If an LLC is used there is some uncertainty regarding the corporate law treatment of certain 
management arrangements commonly employed by funds.  See Halloran et al., supra note 32, at 2001 
Supp. 2-2 (“To date, there has been limited interest shown by venture capitalists in organizing venture 
capital funds as LLCs, although this situation is likely to change in time as fund promoters become more 
comfortable with this new form of legal entity.”)..  Because the tax treatment is the same and the limited 
partnership agreements “work,” (i.e. achieve the goals they are designed to achieve), there is little pressure 
to adopt a new form.
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a trade buyer,39 § 382 restricts the acquiror’s use of NOLs, depressing the value of the tax 
asset.40
Tables 1 through 3 below compare the effects of the Passthrough Structure versus 
the C Corp Structure on pre-tax and after-tax returns of taxable investors in startups.  The 
tables display three scenarios:  
• the Strikeout, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in year one and the startup is 
sold in year six for $500,000, generating a net pre-tax loss of $2.5 million; 
• the Base Hit, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in year one and $3 million in 
year four, and the startup is sold in year six for $14 million, with $12 million of the 
proceeds going to the fund, generating a net pre-tax gain of $6 million for the Fund, 
and 
• the Home Run, in which the VC Fund puts in $3 million in years one, four, and five, 
and the startup IPOs in year six with a market capitalization of $300 million, and the 
Fund sells its stake for $75 million, generating a net pre-tax gain of $66 million for 
the Fund.41
I have (for the moment) adopted a series of common assumptions, each of which favors 
the Passthrough Structure:  (1) zero transaction costs, (2) full use of tax losses by taxable 
LP investors at a 40% marginal tax rate, (3) zero value or discounted value of GainCorp’s 
NOL, and (4) no § 1202 exclusion or § 1045 rollover of capital gains tax on the sale of 
GainCorp stock, which I assume is taxed at an effective rate of 20%.  I use a discount rate 
of 6% to calculate net present value.  Also note that the LP investors’ upside return is 
39
 A “trade buyer” is a larger competitor in the same general industry.  A computer chip startup, for 
example, might look to be acquired by Intel or Texas Instruments.
40
 See § 382.  See Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 
382 and the High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 Va. Tax Rev. 625 (1990); see also Mark Campisano & 
Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 709 (1981).
41
 The baseball metaphor is an unfortunate cliché, but I employ it here because it is the metaphor commonly 
used in the venture capital industry.  A single is often used to denote a 100% return on investment, a double 
for a 2x return, and a home run or grand slam for greater returns.  See also Bankman, Silicon Valley 
Startups, supra note 3, at 1764-65 (“’The industry has a home run mentality,’ stated a prominent venture 
capitalist in response to a similar inquiry into the lack of attention to tax benefits.’  Others interviewed 
expressed like sentiments, often relying on the same baseball metaphor.”).
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reduced by 20% to account for the “carried interest” allocated to the VC professionals 
who manage the Fund. 42
TABLE 1: STRIKEOUT – RETURN FOR TAXABLE LP
(IN $MILLIONS)
Strikeout Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 NPV
LossLLC Pre-tax -3 0 0 0 0 .5 -2.48
LossLLC After-tax -2.28 .12 .12 .12 .12 .4 -1.48
GainCorp Pre-tax -3 0 0 0 0 0.5 -2.48
GainCorp After-tax -3 0 0 0 0 1 -2.13
Strikeout.  On these assumptions LossLLC is clearly superior to GainCorp for 
taxable investors.43  Because LossLLC passes through tax losses, the net present value of 
the $3 million investment in LossLLC is negative $1.48 million, while the net present 
value of the $3 million investment in GainCorp is negative $2.13 million.  Either 
investment generates a net loss, but the tax benefits of the Passthrough Structure ease the 
pain for investors in LossLLC.  The difference in value reflects both the time value of the 
tax losses and the character of the loss; LossLLC’s investors capture the value of the tax 
losses in years one through five at ordinary income rates; GainCorp’s investors capture 
the tax loss in year six at capital gains rates.
TABLE 2: BASE HIT – RETURN FOR TAXABLE LP
Base Hit Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 NPV
LossLLC Pre-tax -3 0 0 -3 0 12 3.25
LossLLC After-tax -2.28 .12 .12 -1.68 .12 8.64 2.91
GainCorp Pre-tax -3 0 0 -3 0 12 3.25
GainCorp After-tax -3 0 0 -3 0 9.84 1.73
Base Hit.  Using the same LossLLC-favorable assumptions, LossLLC is also 
superior to GainCorp in the Base Hit scenario.44  The net present value of the taxable 
42
 The term “carry” or “carried interest” derives from the fact that the VCs’ upside is generated from capital 
contributed by others; if the Fund performs well, the LPs “carry” the VCs along for the ride.
43
 For tax-exempt investors, the return is the same either way.  
The assumptions for the Strikeout scenario are as follows.  In year one, a $3 million investment is 
made, and in year six, the investment is sold for $500,000.  I assume a pre-tax loss of $1.8 million in year 
one, followed by $300,000 in years two, three, four, and five.  In LossLLC, the investment now has a basis 
of zero, and in year six is sold at a gain of $500,000; I assume a 20% capital gains rate.
44
 The assumptions for the Base Hit scenario are as follows.  In year one, a $3 million investment is made.  
In year 4, another $3 million is invested.  In year six, the investment is sold for $12 million.  I assume a 
pre-tax loss of $1.8 million in year one, $300,000 in years two and three, $3,300,000 in year four (i.e. that 
the new investment money is immediately used), and $300,000 in year five.  Once again, all the basis is 
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LPs’ investment in LossLLC is $2.91 million, versus $1.73 million in GainCorp.  As in 
the Strikeout scenario, the present value of the tax losses significantly improves the after-
tax return for taxable LPs.
TABLE 3: HOME RUN – RETURN FOR TAXABLE LP
Home Run Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 NPV
LossLLC Pre-tax -3 0 0 -3 -3 75 45.42
LossLLC After-tax -2.28 .12 .12 -1.68 -1.56 51.24 30.67
GainCorp Pre-tax -3 0 0 -3 -3 77 46.84
GainCorp After-tax -3 0 0 -3 -3 52.52 29.58
Home Run.  Here, LossLLC is only slightly superior to GainCorp, even with all 
the LossLLC-favorable assumptions:  An investment in LossLLC has a net present value 
of $30.67 million versus $29.58 million for GainCorp.  The tax savings pale in 
comparison to the gross amount realized.45
60-30-10 Scenario.  No one knows at the outset whether a venture will succeed or 
not, but it is helpful to assign percentage values estimating the likelihood of success.46
Table 4 below shows the net present value of the investment opportunity in LossLLC or 
GainCorp, using a realistic 60-30-10 scenario (60% chance of strikeout, 30% base hit, 
10% home run).47
used up in LossLLC, and the gain in year six is taxed at a 20% capital gain rate.  One further complication: 
the pre-tax gain is also a “pre-carry” gain; it is reduced by 20% to reflect the carried interest of the VCs, 
then reduced by the 20% capital gains rate to reach the final after-tax return.
45
 The assumptions for the Home Run scenario are as follows.  In years one, four, and five, the Fund invests 
$3 million.  In year six, the investment is sold for $75 million.  The sales price for GainCorp is slightly 
higher, reflect the value of the $9 million NOL.  Again, the “pre-tax” figure is also “pre-carry”; the after-
tax return reflects the reduction for the carried interest of the VCs.
46
 In one sample, which included later stage financings as well as the early stage financings that I am 
focused on here, 50 percent of the total return was generated by only 6.8 percent of the investments; over a 
third of the investments resulted in partial or total loss.  See Theodore Baums & Ronald J. Gilson, 
Comparative Venture Capital Contracting, Working Paper (September 2001) (on file with author); Venture 
Economics, Exiting Venture Capital Investments (1988). In the tech bubble of 1999 and 2000, the 
variability was even greater as some companies were given “nosebleed” valuations by an overheated stock 
market. See generally Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Venture Capital Exits in Canada and 
the United States (2001) (Working Paper available on ssrn.com) (describing breakdown of exits).  During 
the 1990s, the percentage of IPOs increased dramatically, resulting in something like a 50-25-25 
breakdown; since the tech bubble burst, the percentage of IPOs has dropped back to 10% or fewer.
47
 In 2001 there  were just 37 venture-backed IPOs, compared to 226 in 2000 and 257 in 1999.  The number 
of venture-backed M&A transactions, however, increased to 322 from 299 in 2000 and 234 in 1999.  See 
National Venture Capital Association 2002 Yearbook 81 (Thomson Financial Venture Economics 2002).  
Successful exits are therefore still taking place, albeit at lower valuations.  The net IRR figure I use for 
GainCorp, 18%, is, if anything, low by historical standards.  Although venture funds lost 27% on average 
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TABLE 4: NET PRESENT VALUE OF INVESTMENT
60-30-10 Breakdown NPV
LossLLC After-tax 3.05
GainCorp After-tax 2.20
The tables above rely on several key assumptions, including full use of tax losses 
by LPs, a 20% capital gains tax rate, and zero transaction costs.  Given these 
passthrough-favorable assumptions, the LossLLC structure generates a superior after-tax 
return, as expected ($3.05 million vs. $2.20 million).  Calculated in terms of internal rate 
of return, the investment in LossLLC generates an expected IRR of 26%, vs. 18% for 
GainCorp.  If this were the whole story, we would expect startups to opt for the 
Passthrough Structure in order to lower the startup’s financing costs.  But further analysis 
shows that these assumptions are unrealistic.  With more realistic assumptions, the 
balance ultimately tilts in favor of the C Corp Structure.
II.  WHY PARTNERSHIP TAX LOSSES ARE LESS ATTRACTIVE THAN THEY SEEM
When a startup organized as a partnership generates tax losses, the value of those 
losses depends on whether the LP investors have taxable income to offset and whether 
the tax Code allows the LPs to use the losses immediately.  Of the four major classes of 
venture capital investors – U.S. individuals, U.S. corporations, tax-exempt investors, and 
foreign investors – only a subset of one class, widely-held U.S. corporations with current 
tax liability, can use the losses fully and is likely to prefer the Passthrough Structure.  For 
other investors, the Passthrough Structure is actually disadvantageous, as it either creates 
new tax liabilities or eliminates tax benefits available in the C Corp Structure. Moreover, 
the VC professionals who structure the deals so not share in the losses, so they have little 
reason to pay attention to the tax effects of losses.
in 2001, the 3 year average IRR is 49.3%, the 5 year average IRR is 36%, the 10 year average IRR is 27%, 
and the 20 year average IRR is 18%.  See id. at 14.
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A.  The VC Professionals: Indifferent to Losses
The key potential advantage of the Passthrough Structure is the impact of tax 
losses on the LP investors.  But it may be more important to consider first the impact of 
losses on the venture capital professionals (VCs) who manage the funds.  VCs hold a 
substantial economic stake in the funds they manage, but only on the upside.  In a typical 
partnership agreement with LP investors, the VCs contribute just one percent of the 
capital to the fund but receive a carried interest of 20%:  that is, they receive 20% of the 
profits of the entire fund despite only putting up a small amount of money.48  The carry 
gives the VCs a large share of the upside potential but almost none of the downside.  The 
tax losses generated by the Passthrough Structure therefore have almost no value to the 
VCs.49
The VCs’ attitude toward tax losses is significant.  The VCs dictate the deal 
structure at the point of initial investment, even though the startup’s founders technically 
control the startup.  VCs are usually much more experienced and sophisticated in 
structuring investments than the founders, and they tend to be the dominant force in 
negotiations, especially in legal matters.  As a result, agency costs – the tendency for 
agents investing other people’s money to do so in a way that enhances their own personal 
benefit – partly explains why the Passthrough Structure is unpopular.50   The advantages 
of the Passthrough Structure inure almost entirely to the benefit of LPs; the VCs, acting 
48
 To be precise, the VCs receive 20.8% of the profits; the extra 0.8% is generated by the 1% of capital 
contributed by the VCs multiplied by the 80% of profits not already allocated to the VCs.
49
 The arrangement is roughly economically equivalent to giving the VCs an option to buy 20% of the fund 
at a strike price of zero. Like any option, this incentivizes the VCs to make riskier investments than they 
would if they owned a substantial stake in the fund outright and also therefore shared in the losses. On the 
impact of options on the behavior of managers, see, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The 
Most Expensive Way to Pay Future Cash, 52 SMU L. Rev. 423, 443 (1999) (“Stock options, however, 
create truly bizarre incentives for management to squelch dividends and seek out risk, even though it 
damages shareholder wealth.”). 
50
 Classic works on the agency costs problem in corporate governance include Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner 
C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev. ed. 1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991); Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak 
Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (1994).
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as agents for the LPs, ignore this benefit in favor of their own interests.51  To my 
knowledge, prior commentators have not taken this factor into account.52
Agency costs cannot fully account for the VCs’ behavior.  The market for venture 
capital is competitive enough that we would not expect the attitude of the VCs alone to 
explain the general indifference to tax losses.  Agency costs pose the greatest problem 
when the principal has difficulty observing or monitoring the agent’s behavior.  Here, the 
choice of organizational form is an esoteric problem but not impossible to understand.  If 
the Passthrough Structure truly generated significantly better after-tax returns for LPs, 
some savvy VCs might choose that structure and find LPs who were willing to divide the 
extra gains by increasing the VCs’ carried interest or management fee.53  Instead, the C 
Corp Structure remains the industry standard.  The entrenchment of the C Corp Structure 
might be due in part to the fact that tax losses are a hard sell and difficult to employ as a 
bargaining chip.  The structural benefits of flowthrough taxation are not always intuitive 
and may be difficult to discern, especially for investors who are unfamiliar with tax 
arcana.  But indeed if agency costs were the only factor, one would expect sophisticated 
investors to overcome the problem.54
In sum, agency costs are a factor encouraging VCs to ignore tax losses but 
standing alone cannot crack the puzzle.  More important, as I discuss next, is that the 
51
 Cf. Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders’ Split Personality on Corporate Governance: Active in 
Proxies, Passive in IPOs, at 10 (Working paper, 2001) (on file with author) (noting possibility that VCs 
may push for pro-management terms at IPO stage to enhance reputation with management, even though 
those terms hurt LP institutional investors).
52
 On agency costs affecting another aspect of venture capital, see Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The 
Venture Capital Investment Bust: Did Agency Costs Play a Role? Was It Something Lawyers Helped 
Structure?,  77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211, 225 (2002) (discussing costs as possible explanation for continued 
investment in technology companies after the March 2000 NASDAQ collapse).
53
 See Gompers & Lerner, Venture Capital Cycle, supra note 32, ch. 4 (analyzing LP agreements and 
concluding that while carried interest percentages are held constant, management fees vary depending on 
the ability and experience of the VCs).
54
 An additional agency costs factor may have helped cement the status quo, especially in the late 1990s: 
law firms that wish to make equity investments in their clients may prefer the C Corp Structure, as 
becoming a “partner” in the client’s business venture may create a greater appearance of impropriety than 
merely holding common stock or options in a corporate client.  The relevant conflict of interest rules, 
however, do not rely on a per se approach or draw distinctions based on formalities, but rather look to the 
degree to which the law firms’ independence might be compromised.  See generally John S. Dzienkowski 
& Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 Tex. 
L. Rev. 405 (2002).    
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potential market for these tax losses is quite small:  tax rules make losses attractive to 
only a small subset of potential LP investors.
B.  Individual Investors:  Passive Loss Constraints 
Individuals make up a relatively small portion of the venture capital investor 
pool.55  The securities laws exclude many potential investors by limiting the eligibility of 
individuals to “accredited investors” who have annual income in excess of $200,000 or 
net worth in excess of $1,000,000.56  The securities laws are not the only limiting factor, 
however:  special tax rules enacted in 1986 discourage venture capital investment by 
individuals, including high net worth individuals exempt from securities laws restrictions.
In 1986 Congress enacted the passive loss rules of § 469 as part of an effort to
shut down abusive tax shelters.57  An unintended consequence of this legislation was to 
make passive investing in partnerships a tax-disfavored activity, even for “real” deals not 
generally considered abusive. 58  In the absence of § 469, individuals would be permitted 
to take passive losses to offset ordinary income.  Section 469 disallows current 
deductions for losses generated by passive activities, except to the extent the taxpayer has 
passive income.59  Taxpayers may use passive losses to offset ordinary non-passive 
income, but only at the termination of the venture, thus removing the timing advantage 
which is key to traditional tax sheltering activity.  For purposes of § 469, passive 
activities are defined as activities which involve the conduct of a trade or business in 
which the taxpayer does not materially participate.60  The rules for determining what 
constitutes “material” participation are complex.61  Absent unusual circumstances, 
55
 In 2001, 9% of capital commitments came from individuals and families.  See 2002 NVCA Handbook , 
supra note 45, at 23.  This figure appears to include family trusts.
56
 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (Rule 501 of Regulation D).
57
 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, at pin (Comm. Print 1987).
58
 See Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss 
Restrictions, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 15 (1989) (hereinafter Bankman, Passive Loss Rules).
59
 See § 469.
60
 See § 469(a)(1), 469(c).
61
 See Bankman, Passive Loss Rules, supra note 54, at 24 (noting that the restrictions “comprise one of the 
more complicated areas of the tax law”).
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however, the passive loss rules prevent limited partners in VC funds from immediately 
using the losses, as LPs do not normally help manage the portfolio companies in any 
significant way.62  The tax losses in the Passthrough Structure flow through to the VC 
Fund and then to the LPs, but individuals may not use those losses immediately to offset 
taxable income from non-passive activities.  The passive losses are instead “suspended” 
or carried forward and may be used only to offset passive income, or may be added to 
basis when the LP’s interest in the passive activity is sold.63  The present value of the tax 
loss is thereby significantly diminished.64  For individual investors, the passive loss rules 
suffocate the very purpose of the Passthrough Structure by eliminating the benefit of the 
flowthrough of tax losses.
62
 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Loss Rules, BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio 549-2nd at 21 (2000) (discussing 
material participation standard).  The VCs, unlike the LPs, would have a very strong argument that their 
oversight of portfolio companies constitutes material participation.  But under the terms of the economic 
deal, VCs are usually allocated 20% of the gains and just 1% of the losses, so the tax losses matter little to 
the VCs.  Similarly, the entrepreneurs who manage the portfolio company would not be constrained by the 
passive loss rules, but would also likely have an economic arrangement which effectively allocates to the 
only gains and not losses.
Angel investors are often U.S. high-net-worth individuals, and the companies that they invest in 
are sometimes structured as partnerships.  Although the involvement of angel investors varies widely, many 
avoid the passive loss rules because they often sit on the boards of directors of the companies they invest in 
and provide advice to the founders and management, creating a good argument for “material participation,” 
depending on the facts and circumstances.  The availability of the losses to angel investors helps explain 
why at the pre VC stage, many companies are structured as partnerships, while at the VC stage, they 
convert to corporations.
63
 See §§ 469(d)(1), 469(g).  Some wealthy individuals with passive losses do have (or seek out) 
investments that create passive income.  Such passive income generators, appropriately called PIGs, would 
benefit from the passthrough structure.  For many taxpayers, however, it is difficult to convert nonpassive 
income – e.g., salary – income passive income.  See Daniel Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189, 1256 (1989) (“For many taxpayers, such as professionals and salaried employees, 
it is not feasible to convert significant amounts of compensation income into passive income. … Some 
taxpayers, however, such as entrepreneurs who own and operate a variety of businesses, may have 
considerably less difficulty creating passive income and nonpassive losses; but the passive loss rules 
probably reduce substantially the pool of investment dollars that are available for investments designed to 
produce tax losses.”)
64
 Eliminating the time value of the tax losses is enough to discourage classic “tax shelter” activity in which 
individuals are willing to incur long-term economic losses to achieve short-term tax benefits.  
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C. Foreign Investors: ECI Concerns
As a practical matter, foreign investors cannot benefit from the tax losses in the 
Passthrough Structure.  Foreign individuals are subject to the passive loss rules, so that 
just as with U.S. individuals, the flowthrough of tax losses has no significant benefit.  For 
foreign corporations that invest in VC funds, two primary concerns make the Passthrough 
Structure unattractive:  (1) the concept of effectively connected income, or “ECI”, and (2) 
the branch profits tax of § 884.65
A complex set of rules governs the taxation of foreign corporations that invest in 
U.S. companies.  Foreign corporations that sell stock in a U.S. corporation are generally 
exempt from U.S. capital gains tax on any appreciation in that stock.66  So long as a 
foreign corporation is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business by operating a U.S. 
subsidiary or unincorporated U.S. branch, capital gains from investment in the U.S. are 
not taxed in the U.S., although the corporation may owe tax in its home jurisdiction.  This
general exemption for capital gains encourages foreign investment in U.S. securities and 
prevents double taxation across different jurisdictions.67
To ensure that foreign corporations that operate a business in the U.S. do not 
enjoy an advantage over U.S. corporations, foreign corporations are taxed in the U.S. on 
income which is “effectively connected” with a U.S. trade or business.68  The 
Passthrough Structure, which makes intermediate entities in the structure transparent for 
tax purposes, creates a situation where the tax law treats the LPs at the top of the structure 
as if they directly own a pro rata portion of the startup’s business.  If a startup is 
organized as a partnership for tax purposes, and the startup is engaged in a U.S. trade or 
business, then each foreign LP of the VC Fund investing in the startup is deemed to be 
engaged in the startup’s trade or business.69  Under §§ 871 or 881, the foreign LP investor 
65
 Professor Bankman did not focus on the effect of tax rules in foreign investors, perhaps because fewer 
foreign companies invested in the U. S. venture capital market in 1994 than today. 
66
 See § 871(a)(2) (imposing tax on foreign persons only if present in the U.S. for at least 183 days during 
the taxable year).
67
 See generally Fred B. Brown, Federal Income Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Corporations: 
Separate Entity or Separate Rules, 49 Tax L. Rev. 133, 145 (1993) (describing ECI rules).
68
 See §§ 872(a)(2), 882(a)(1).
69
 See § 875(l); see also § 702(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (noting that the character of partnership gains 
allocated to each partner under § 702(a) is determined at the partnership level).
DRAFT of 8/7/03
21
must pay U.S. tax on the “effectively connected income,” or ECI, generated by that 
portion of the business.  Recognizing ECI is problematic because many foreign investors 
want to avoid the U.S. tax system altogether, including the obligation to file a U.S. tax 
return.70  The concern is serious enough that many fund agreements require the VCs to 
promise to avoid generating ECI.71
The branch profits tax is an additional concern for foreign corporations.  
Assuming that the startup generates tax losses in the early years of the venture, the 
possibility of ECI would appear to be a red herring, since tax is due only to the extent that 
there is taxable income, not loss.  But § 884, which imposes a branch profits tax on U.S. 
divisions of foreign corporations, uses the ECI concept to make exiting the Passthrough 
Structure difficult for foreign LPs.  Under § 884, a foreign corporation must pay tax on 
deemed repatriations of earnings by U.S. divisions of foreign corporations.72  Because the 
Passthrough Structure causes the LPs to be treated as if they owned a portion of the 
startup’s business directly, § 884 treats the startup as if it were a branch of the foreign 
corporation.  When the appreciation in the value of the startup is realized through the VC 
Fund’s sale of its interest in the startup, the foreign LP’s pro rata portion is subject to the 
branch profits tax at a marginal rate of up to 54.5 percent.73  If, on the other hand, the 
portfolio company were organized as a C Corporation, the foreign investor would not be 
treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or business and would not be subject to the branch 
profits tax of § 884.  Instead, the foreign LP would take advantage of the usual foreign 
investor exemption for capital gains.74
70
 See Andrew R. Bronstein, Mitchell Presser & David E. Shapiro, Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis of 
Structural, Erisa and Securities Issues, 1276 PLI / Corp 7, 17 n.23 (2001) (noting that foreign private equity 
investors prefer to use blocker corporation that files U.S. return).
71
 See Halloran et al., supra note 32, at 1-29.
72
 See § 884.
73
 See Needham, supra note 32, at 1231.  For foreign individual LPs, the sale of the partnership is treated as 
a deemed sale of a pro rata share of partnership interests, resulting in ECI gain.  See Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-
1 C.B. 107.  But see Kimberly Blanchard, “Rev. Rul. 91-32: Extrastatutory Attribution of Partnership 
Activities to Partners,” 1776 Tax Notes 1331 (1997) (criticizing IRS’s use of aggregate theory of 
partnerships in this context).  The basic policy principle that seems to be at stake here is whether business 
profits generated in the U.S. must be subject to at least one level of tax.
74
 Foreign investors are usually taxed in the U.S. only on income that is ECI or certain types of fixed 
passive income (FDAP income) subject to withholding, and real estate investments.
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Careful tax planning can enable foreign corporations to invest in U.S. venture 
capital funds that invest in portfolio companies structured as partnerships.  A “blocker” 
entity can be inserted into the structure to block the passthrough effects of the partnership 
form; the passthrough of income and loss extends up the organizational chain only until 
there is a non-transparent taxpayer.  If a blocker entity intervenes, the blocker entity traps 
income or loss at that level, the foreign LP’s income from the startup is not “effectively 
connected,” and the branch profits tax does not apply.  Because the blocker entity traps 
not just gains but losses as well, however, the tax losses are not passed through to the 
investor for its immediate benefit.75  Thus, the necessary blocker entity structure 
eliminates the benefit of the tax losses that would have motivated the use of the 
Passthrough Structure in the first place.  For the sake of simplicity in deal planning, the C 
Corp Structure is preferred.76
D. Tax-Exempt Investors:  UBTI Concerns
Tax-exempt entities such as pension funds and university endowments comprise 
the largest investor class in the venture capital industry.77  Such entities do not have to 
pay tax on investment income.  They do, however, have to pay tax on unrelated business 
taxable income, also known as “UBTI”.78  Because deemed ownership of an operating 
business generates unwanted UBTI, tax-exempt investors want to avoid being treated as 
if they own a portion of the startup’s business.79
Tax-exempt entities prefer to receive returns on their investments in the form of 
returns not taxable to them (i.e., most investment interest, dividends, and capital gains), 
and they scrupulously avoid deal structures that pass through a pro rata portion of the 
ordinary income from a business, which is taxable as UBTI.  Because the Passthrough 
75
 See Needham, supra note 32, at 1386.
76
 There is also a possibility that the blocker entity will not be respected (i.e. treated as a mere shell).  See 
Needham, supra note 32, at pin.
77
 See 2002 NVCA Yearbook, supra note 45, at 23 (reporting that 42% of investors are private and public 
pension funds, and an additional 22% are endowments and foundations).  
78
 See § 511.
79
 See § 512(c)(1).  Section 514 also recasts interest, dividends and capital gains that are otherwise exempt 
as UBTI if the underlying property is debt-financed (whether the investment is leveraged at the tax-exempt 
entity level or the partnership level).  Unlike hedge funds, which are frequently leveraged, venture capital 
funds usually are not, making the debt-financed exception to the UBTI rule less important in this context.
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Structure is transparent for tax purposes, tax-exempt LP investors are treated as if they 
own a pro rata portion of the startup’s business directly, just as with foreign investors, 
and any income generated by the business is UBTI.  Tax-exempt investors go to great 
lengths to ensure that they have no reportable UBTI at all, as having even a small amount 
of UBTI is thought to greatly increase the risk of audit.  Because the tax Code treats LPs 
in the Passthrough Structure as directly engaged in the business of the startup, and the 
startup’s business is unlikely to be consistent with the § 501(c)(3) status of the 
organization, it is sometimes said that investing in numerous portfolio companies 
structured as partnerships could potentially endanger the tax-exempt status of the entire 
organization.80  While this result would be unlikely, it is safe to say that tax-exempt 
investors have a valid reason to prefer the simpler C Corp Structure.81
Finally, to make a rather obvious point, tax-exempt investors do not care about 
tax losses, since they do not have tax liability which could be offset by such losses, 
except in the unusual case in which they have UBTI from other investments.  The sole 
concern for most tax-exempt investors is the pre-tax return on the investment.  To the 
extent that tax-exempt investors think about tax consequences at all, it is to ensure that 
they do not recognize any UBTI.82
E. Corporate Taxable Investors
There is one key class of investors not subject to any significant tax law 
restrictions:  Corporate LPs.  The tax losses generated by the Passthrough Structure are 
potentially valuable to Corporate LPs; widely-held corporations are not subject to the 
passive loss rules of § 469, and many corporations have current tax liability that they 
would like to shelter.83  Some corporations do invest in startups, and one would expect 
80
 It is worth noting that absent the fear of audit, the partnership structure would make sense for some 
foreign and tax-exempt investors, as the early losses of startups could be used to offset other ECI/UBTI 
gains subject to U.S. tax on a net basis.  See Needham, supra note 32, at 1231 n.96.
81
 As with foreign investors, a “blocker” structure can be used to try to eliminate UBTI, eliminating both 
the disadvantage and advantage of the Passthrough Structure.
82
 In Silicon Valley Startups, Professor Bankman noted the effect of the Passthrough Structure on tax-
exempt investors but argued that if the Passthrough Structure were adopted, corporate taxable investors 
might fill in the gap. I discuss this argument in the next section, infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
83
 See §§ 469 (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C) (applying passive loss rules only to closely-held C corporations and to 
personal service corporations).
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such investors to push for the investment to be structured in the most tax-efficient form.  
For example, Intel owns several funds which invest strategically in startups.84  When 
Intel invests in a startup organized as a partnership, and the startup generates tax losses in 
the early years of the venture, Intel may use the tax losses generated from that investment 
to offset taxable income from its normal business operations.  If, on the other hand, the 
startup is organized as a corporation, and Intel’s investment falls short of the 80% 
threshold needed to bring the startup within Intel’s consolidated tax return, Intel cannot 
benefit from the startup’s losses.85  Why, then, are Corporate LPs content with the C Corp 
Structure?
Three non-tax factors explain why corporate investors traditionally play a small 
role in venture capital investing and why, when they do invest in venture capital, they 
prefer the C Corp Structure: 1)  accounting treatment, 2) the passive nature of the 
relationship between the LPs and the startup, and 3) the networking bond between the 
VCs and tax-exempt LPs.  
Corporate managers focus heavily on reported GAAP earnings, not after-tax 
returns.86  A corporate taxable investor in the Passthrough Structure would see an 
increase in after-tax earnings compared to the C Corp Structure, but the losses which 
generate tax savings would depress reported earnings on the corporate investor’s income 
statement to shareholders.87  If the startup is organized as a corporation, a minority 
investor must use the “equity method” – where losses are immediately reflected on the 
income statement – only if the interest exceeds 20%.88  But if the corporate investor’s 
interest is less than 20%, as would usually be the case for a corporate LP investing in a
startup though a VC Fund, then the corporate LP may use the “cost method,” in which 
84
 See Intel Capital – Intel Strategic Investment Program, http://www.intel.com/capital/index.htm (site last 
visited August 6, 2002).  Interestingly, even the startups in Intel’s portfolio are structured as C 
Corporations, even though Intel could benefit from the tax losses and would not be constrained by the 
passive loss rules.  See http://www.intel.com/capital/portfolio/intelcapital-portfoliolist.pdf (site last visited 
August 6, 2002) (listing portfolio companies).  Because many of Intel’s investments are syndicated, 
however, it is possible that the C Corp Structure is chosen to ensure the participation of other elite VC 
funds who rely on pension funds and other tax-exempt investors.
85
 See § 1501 et seq..
86
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1763.
87
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1764
88
 APB 18.  
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gains or losses are not recognized on the income statement until the investment is sold.  
And so in the usual case where a startup suffers early losses that may be offset by later 
gains, the cost method results in a prettier picture for shareholders and analysts.  If, on the 
other hand, the startup is organized as a partnership, then an interest of just 3-5% requires 
use of the equity method.89  The startup’s losses depress reported earnings even though 
the true value of the investment is the same regardless of form.
Professor Bankman has noted that this disparity in accounting treatment leads to 
the conclusion that corporate managers “appear to sacrifice tax benefits at the altar of 
reported earnings.”90  As he explains, this conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the 
strong or semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis.91  A reduction in reported 
earnings caused by investment in the Passthrough Structure should, in theory, be 
disregarded by analysts and sophisticated investors setting the stock price.  But we know 
from recent history that investors are often too willing to focus on reported earnings, and 
their ability to look through financial reporting is very much in question.92  To be sure, 
blaming accounting treatment for a tax-inefficient strategy is troubling, as one would 
hope that there might be some corporate managers willing to explain the deal structure to 
analysts in order to achieve the greater goal of maximizing after-tax returns.93  But given 
89
 See EITF Topic D-46, Accounting for Limited Partnership Investments.
90
 See also Joseph Bankman & Ronald Gilson, Why Start-Ups, 51 Stan L. Rev. 289, 299-306 (1999) 
(describing difficulties corporations encounter when bidding for employees’ new ideas).
91
 The efficient market hypothesis posits that a market is efficient if it is impossible to make a profit by 
trading based on the basis of a  information set; the weak form of EMH uses past prices as the information 
set; the semi-strong form uses all publicly available information as the information set, and the strong form 
uses all information, including private and insider information.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A 
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, & Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 761, 771 
n.19 (1985) (defining forms of EMH).
92
 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern 
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1236 (citing an analyst describing 
Enron as a “faith” stock); Victor Fleischer, Enron’s Dirty Little Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 
94 Tax Notes 1045, 1047 (2002) (noting that some of Enron’s accounting gimmicks were “hiding in plain 
sight”).
93
 There is also anecdotal evidence that VCs don’t like to deal with corporate LPs.  One venture capitalist 
explained that corporate LPs try to “meddle” with the fund’s investment decisions and, moreover, often 
aren’t very good at understanding the marketplace for new products.  Tax-exempt investors, on the other 
hand, tend to be more passive and spread out their investments across many different VC funds, reducing 
their anxiety level about each particular investment and making life easier for the VC professionals 
managing the fund.  
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the real world importance of reported earnings, the accounting treatment of the 
Passthrough Structure is a non-trivial factor.
The passive nature of the relationship between the LPs and the startup is a second 
nontax factor that discourages corporate investors from entering VC-managed funds.  
Corporate managers like to take an active role in their investments, based on their 
expertise in the corporations’ underlying business.  Corporations invest in startups, only 
when they believe they can create value by taking on an active role in advising the 
startup, thus assuming a role usually performed by the VCs.  The presence of the VCs, 
then, makes little sense, as it simply adds another layer of complexity to the management
structure.  Empirical results show that this logic holds up in the real world:  corporate 
venture investments perform on par with noncorporate investments only when there is a 
strategic fit between the corporate investor and the startup.94
A third nontax factor that discourages VCs from courting corporate LPs is the 
value of the networking bond between the VCs and tax-exempt LPs.  VCs often have 
close relationships with the tax-exempt investors in their funds.  Tax-exempts are long-
term relationship investors likely to make repeat investments with the same VC 
professionals over time.  VCs like the passive approach that tax-exempts take to their 
investments, leaving the VC professionals with broad discretion over the management of 
the investments in portfolio companies.
Corporate LPs, on the other hand, are meddlesome.  As noted above, they are 
more likely to seek an active role (or at least a monitoring role) with respect to the 
portfolio companies.  There may even be an increased risk that the Corporate LP may 
appropriate the intellectual property of the portfolio company.  Moreover, it is difficult 
for VC professionals to develop relationships with corporate managers, even over the ten 
94
 See Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: 
Organizational Structure, Incentives and Complementarities, NBER Working Paper 6725.  Even in 
successful programs, corporate investors appear to invest at a premium, but as explained by Gompers & 
Lerner, the premium might make sense.  They explain, “Portfolio companies receiving funds from 
corporate investors with a well-defined strategic focus enjoy greater success.  Investments are made at a 
premium, but this may reflect the indirect benefits that the corporation receives.  Corporate programs with a 
well-defined strategic focus also appear to be as stable as traditional independent venture organizations.  
Among the corporate funds without a sound strategic focus, we see significantly less success in the 
investments and less stability among the focused funds.”  Id. at 4.
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year period of a fund, as turnover rates are much higher at corporations than at tax-
exempts like CalPers or TIAA-CREF.  
Finally, Corporate LPs have a well-earned reputation for being fickle investors 
who do not always live up to their funding commitments.  When a venture fund is 
formed, the LPs do not contribute cash up front.  Rather, each LP makes a commitment to 
contribute cash when a “capital call” is issued, which occurs over a period of two to four 
years as the VC Fund identifies worthy investments.  Default rates among Corporate LPs 
are higher than among tax-exempts and this has been especially true in recent years.
In sum, key tax and nontax factors make the tax losses – the central advantage of 
the Passthrough Structure – worth less than they appear.  The lack of attention paid to tax 
losses is not irrational or based on myth, but rather makes sense in the context of the 
current tax rules, accounting rules, and institutional investment market.   
III.  GAINS ARE TAXED MORE FAVORABLY UNDER THE C CORP STRUCTURE
Tax losses have potential economic value to some corporate LP investors if a 
Passthrough Structure is used.  For the VC professionals and entrepreneurs who negotiate 
the deal structure, however, gains are taxed more favorably if the C Corp Structure is 
used.  The tax landscape has changed significantly in the last decade, making the 
treatment of gains more sensitive to the choice of deal structure.  In 1992 Congress 
enacted § 1202, a tax subsidy designed to encourage long-term investment in small 
businesses, including venture capital startups.95  Section 1202 provides for a partial 
capital gains exemption on the sale of stock in certain small businesses.  In 1997, 
Congress expanded the subsidy further with § 1045, which provides for the rollover of 
capital gains on the sale of small business stock if the proceeds are reinvested in another 
small business.  This subsidy helps explain why venture capital professionals and other 
taxable individual investors prefer the C Corp Structure.  
95
 See Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, Start-Ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax 
(2002) (available on ssrn.com).  See David A. Guenther & Michael Willenborg, 53 J. Fin. Econ. 385 (1999) 
(finding that §1202 reduced cost of capital for small business).
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A.  The Qualified Small Business Stock Subsidy
Section 1202 provides a partial exclusion of capital gains for investors in certain 
small businesses.96  The section only applies if the business is organized as a C 
Corporation, not a partnership or other passthrough entity.  Normally, if an individual 
investor sells stock in a corporation at a gain, and the stock has been held for more than a 
year, then the gain on the sale is treated as capital gain and taxed at 20% rate.97  Under § 
1202, which governs the sale of “qualified small business stock,” 50% of the gains are 
excluded from the base rate of 28%, effectively creating a 14% capital gains rate.98
A taxpayer must clear several hurdles to qualify for the § 1202 exclusion: among 
other things, the stock of the qualified small business (QSB) must be held for more than 
five years, the stock must be acquired from the QSB at original issue, and the gross assets 
of the QSB must not exceed $50 million at the time of issuance.99  The exclusion is not 
available for corporate investors.100  The exclusion is, however, important to other 
taxable investors (i.e. VCs and entrepreneurs), as many portfolio companies financed by 
VC funds do qualify as QSBs.101
Section 1045, which is an extension of § 1202, takes the benefits of QSB status 
even farther.  Under § 1045, taxpayers may roll over the gain otherwise recognized on the 
sale of QSB stock to the extent the gain is reinvested in a new QSB within six months.102
The rollover provision has the effect of pushing down the effective tax rate below 14%, 
96
 See § 1202.
97
 See §§ 1221(a) (defining “capital asset”), 1222(3) (defining long-term capital gain), 1(h)(1) (describing 
rate structure.  Before 2003, the usual capital gains rate was 20% for most long-term holdings, or 18% for 
certain property held for five or more years.  As discussed below, in 2003, the usual capital gains rate 
dropped to 15%, making the § 1202 rules less significant.
98
 See § 1202(c)(1) (restricting definition of qualified small business stock to stock in a C Corporation).
99
 See §§ 1202(a)(1) (5 year requirement), 1202(c)(1)(B) (original issue requirement); 1202 (d)(1)(B) 
($50,000,000 limitation).
100
 See § 1202(a)(1) (making 1202 exclusion available “[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, 
...”).
101
  The application of the § 1202 exclusion to limited partners in a venture fund is somewhat complicated, 
as it is normally the fund and not the limited partner that sells the stock of the QSB.  But the tax Code 
allows the tax break to work to the advantage of the limited partner.  The partnership tax rules take an 
aggregate approach rather than an entity approach, allowing each individual partner of the VC fund to 
recognize his or her pro rata portion of the capital gain and then apply the 50% exclusion. See § 1202(g).
102
 See § 1045(a).
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theoretically approaching zero if all proceeds are continuously reinvested in new 
businesses.
This picture has become a bit more complicated with the passage of the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.  The 2003 bill lowered the usual capital 
gains rate from 20% to 15%, but section 1202 gain is still calculated from a base rate of 
28%, thus closing the differential in rates from 6% to a slim 1%.  Section 1202 thus has 
more explanatory power for how startups were structure from 1992-2002 than now.  The 
rollover provision of section 1045, however, remains important.
A simple example may help illustrate the mechanics of the exclusion before 2003.  
Suppose a taxpayer pays $1 million for stock of a startup that is a QSB.  The taxpayer 
holds the stock for five years, sells it for $3 million and then buys stock of a new 
qualified startup for $1 million.  Absent §§ 1045 and 1202, the taxpayer would face a 
capital gains tax of 20% times the $2 million gain, or $400,000.103  With §§ 1045 and 
1202, the current tax due is $140,000, since $1 million of gain is rolled over under § 
1045, and the remaining $1 million of gain is taxed at the reduced §1202 rate.104
Although some of the rollover amount will be recaptured later, when the stock in the new 
company with a carryover basis is sold, the end result is an effective tax rate somewhere 
between 7% and 14%.  This rate is significantly lower than the 20% rate before 2003, 
and, in many circumstances, significantly lower than the 15% rate that currently applies. 
103
 See §§ 1, 1221.
104
 The gain rolled over under § 1045 is deferred, not excluded, as basis in the replacement QSB stock 
would be zero.  See § 1045(b)(3).
The careful reader will note that the Code does not make it clear if both sections may be used 
together, and if so, in which order sections 1202 and 1045 apply.  In accordance with what appears to be 
common practice, I apply 1045 first, then 1202, resulting in the lowest possible immediate tax due.  
Alternatively, one could apply section 1202 alone, resulting in an immediate tax due of $280,000, section 
1045 alone, resulting in an immediate tax due of $200,000, or 1202 first, resulting in a tax due of $280,000 
and a $1,000,000 reduction in the basis of the replacement stock purchased.  See Cheryl T. Metrejean et al., 
Gains on Sales of Qualified Small Business Stock (manuscript on file with author).
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SECTION 1202/1045 EXAMPLE
Amount Realized
     Less 1045 Rollover Amount
= Adjusted Amount Realized
     Less Basis                           
= Taxable Gain
* 14% (1202 tax rate)
= Tax Due
3,000,000
(1,000,000)
2,000,000
(1,000,000)
1,000,000
             .14
140,000
The QSBS subsidy is significant to VCs and entrepreneurs.  VCs often require 
portfolio companies to qualify: QSB status is part of the standard set of representations 
and warranties found in VC Fund-portfolio company contracts.105  While the prevalence 
of this standard requirement does not prove that the §§ 1202/1045 tax break drives the 
structuring decision, it at least shows that the deal planners (or their lawyers) are aware of 
the tax incentive.106
B.  Agency Costs, Continued: Impact of 1202/1045 and NOLs on VC 
Professionals
Just as with losses, agency costs help explain the preference for the C Corp 
Structure regarding gains. The QSBS subsidy does not improve the after-tax returns for 
most LP investors, since corporate taxable investors are not allowed to take advantage of 
the subsidy, and tax-exempts and foreign investors do not pay any capital gains tax to 
begin with.  However, the venture capital professionals who manage funds and drive 
structuring decisions do benefit significantly from the QSBS subsidy, making their effect 
on the structuring decision stronger than might be expected.  Because the QSBS rules 
105
 See Form of Stock Purchase Agreement, § III (aa) (on file with author) (describing “Section 1202 
Compliance”).  
106
 The C Corp Structure was preferred by deal planners before the §§ 1202/1045 subsidies were enacted; 
the subsidies are probably best viewed as a factor that reinforces the decision to adopt the C Corp Structure 
rather than a true cause.  Indeed, the subsidies may be viewed as an effect rather than as a cause:  there is 
no logical policy reason to limit the subsidies to C Corporations, but the NVCA had a significant role in 
lobbying for the tax break, and limiting the benefit to C Corporations arguably serves as a good proxy for 
limiting the benefit to venture capital companies rather than other small businesses.  On the lobbying 
efforts of the NVCA, see, e.g., Steven Lazarus, In the Midst of Tax Cut Debate, QSBS Capital Gains Tax 
Fix is Within Reach, Venture Capital J., Apr. 1, 2001 (describing NVCA lobbying effort to improve effect 
of QSBS on taxpayers subject to AMT). 
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apply only to the sale of corporate stock, not partnership interests, the tax law gives VCs 
a strong reason to prefer the C Corp Structure.
Also – although this is a counterintuitive point – the C Corp Structure also 
benefits VCs by trapping tax losses at the entity level.107  In the Passthrough Structure, a 
$100 tax loss by the startup generates a $1 tax loss for VCs, since VCs are allocated just 
1% of the tax losses.  The $1 tax loss would be worth, at most, about 40 cents.  In the C 
Corp Structure, that same $100 tax loss creates a $100 NOL, which might have a value to 
the company of $20, depending on the company’s likelihood and timing of future taxable 
income (and the application of § 382, as discussed above).  When the VC Fund exits the 
investment, the NOL would increase the valuation of the company by $20.  This $20 
increase in valuation might be worth about $2 to the VCs, since VCs share in 20% of the 
gains allocated to the Fund, and the Fund might be allocated one-half of the increase in 
valuation, the balance going to the common stockholders.  By converting tax losses into 
an asset which increases valuations, the C Corp Structure makes tax losses about five 
times more valuable to VCs (albeit less valuable to other investors) – $2 in the C Corp 
Structure versus 40 cents in the Passthrough Structure – depending on the discount rate 
and various restrictions on the company’s ability to use the NOL.108  In effect, the VCs 
can expropriate value that would otherwise belong to the LPs, but, to claim this share, the 
VCs must shrink the size of the overall pie.
The QSBS subsidy has a more substantial effect on the VC’s after-tax returns.  In 
the examples in section one, I assumed that capital gains were taxed at a 20% rate.  On 
that assumption, the predicted value of VC’s carried interest is worth, after-tax, $1.15 
million for GainCorp and $1.08 million for LossLLC.  The C Corp Structure generates a 
carried interest which, after taxes, is $70,000 greater.109  If, however, we assume that § 
107
 I think the point is counterintuitive because it is, at first glance, hard to see how anyone would benefit 
from trapping losses and thereby hurting the timing value of those losses.
108 To illustrate the effect of the NOL on the VCs’ carry, I return to the GainCorp/LossLLC example from 
the “Home Run” scenario in section one above.  In the example, I assume that GainCorp’s NOL, which has 
a face value of $9 million, has a real value of $3 million in the eyes of public investors who value the 
company when it goes public.  GainCorp goes public with a valuation of $303 million, while LossLLC 
receives a valuation of $300 million.   Because of the presence of the NOL, the pre-tax predicted value of 
the VC’s carried interest is slightly higher from the investment in GainCorp versus LossLLC, $1.44 million 
versus $1.35 million.  While this is a difference of only $90,000, it is nonetheless significant.
109
 The $70,000 increase results from the NOL. 
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1202 applies, and that capital gains are taxed at 14%, then the GainCorp carry is worth 
$1.24 million, versus $1.08 million for LossLLC.  If we further assume that the VCs then 
raise another fund of, say, $20 million dollars, and they commit $200,000 of their own 
capital to the new fund, investing $100,000 in new QSB stock within the required time 
frame, then the $100,000 would qualify for rollover under § 1045, and the GainCorp 
carry is worth $1.34 million versus $1.08 million for LossLLC.  In this case, the VCs’ 
after-tax return on the investment in GainCorp is $260,000 greater than the after-tax 
return on the investment in LossLLC, an increase of nearly 20%.
In sum, because VCs are compensated with a portion of the gains of the entire 
fund and share in virtually none of the losses, it is entirely rational for them to focus on 
the tax consequences of potential gains and maximize their own after-tax returns.  The 
effect of NOLs and the QSBS subsidy of §§ 1202 and 1045 give VCs another rational 
reason to prefer the C Corp Structure.  
IV.  COMPLEXITY AND THE C CORP ADVANTAGE
It has been easier, historically, to create and run a startup organized as a 
corporation rather than as a partnership or LLC.  Lawyers and deal planners are 
becoming more adept at addressing the complexities associated with passthrough entities, 
but some tricky issues remain.  It is worth highlighting three areas which illustrate how 
the corporate form is simpler and easier: employee compensation, corporate governance, 
and exit strategy.110
110
 In Silicon Valley Startups, Professor Bankman recognized the complexity of partnerships as a reason 
commonly cited by deal planners for preferring the C Corp structure, but he seemed to view this as more of 
a perceived burden than a real one.  See Bankman, supra note 3, at 1751-53.  Similarly, Professor Bankman 
did not place much emphasis on the added complexity as it relates to corporate governance or exit strategy. 
For the reasons discussed below, I think that complexity is a significant friction preventing deal planners 
from choosing the C Corp structure. 
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A.  Compensating Employees is Simpler
For an entrepreneur thinking about forming or joining a new business, 
compensation issues make the C Corp Structure more attractive than the Passthrough 
Structure.  Partnership tax law treats any employee with an equity stake as a partner, 
complicating compensation issues and increasing tax liabilities for the employees.  The 
chief obstacle relates to the tax treatment of partnership options, although a preliminary 
discussion of § 83 and the general tax treatment of property granted in exchange for 
services may be helpful in framing the relevant issues.   
Section 83.  Section 83 is a timing rule governing what happens when an 
employee is given property in exchange for services.  The baseline rule is that such 
property is the equivalent of cash salary and is taxable as ordinary income at that point in 
time at which the property is not subject to substantial risk of forfeiture.111  The C Corp 
Structure allows employees to recognize much of this amount as capital gain through § 
83(b), which allows employees to elect to lock in the ordinary income amount at the 
initial valuation of the property, ensuring that any future appreciation is treated as capital 
gain.112  In the C Corp Structure, the founders and managers of the startup own the 
common stock, while the VC Fund takes convertible preferred stock.  Because of the 
liquidation preference attached to the preferred stock, entrepreneurs use a low valuation 
for the common stock when it is first received and make the § 83(b) election, which 
ensures capital gain treatment on the subsequent sale of the stock.113
This result can generally be replicated in the Passthrough Structure with some 
additional planning.114  Instead of stock, the entrepreneur receives a profits interest in the 
partnership.115  When the time comes to incorporate the startup, the entrepreneur 
exchanges her profits interest in the partnership for common stock in the newly formed 
111
 See § 83.
112
 See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 32.
113
 See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 32.
114
 See Armando Gomez, Selected Issues Relating to Domestic and Foreign Technology Start-Ups and 
Joint Ventures, 498 PLI/Tax 975, 997 (2001). (“When the venture is organized as a corporation, the issues 
related to granting equity to employees are easier, but equivalent benefits typically can be granted when the 
venture is organized as a partnership with some additional planning.”)
115
 The grant of a profits interest to a service provider may be done without triggering current tax.  See Rev. 
Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
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corporation.  The entrepreneur takes a carryover basis in the stock.  Since the 
entrepreneur had a zero basis in the profits interest, she has a zero basis in the stock.  
When the stock is subsequently sold, the entrepreneur will pay tax on all the appreciation 
at a long-term capital gains rate.116 Until recently there was some concern whether this 
strategy worked, but in 2001 the IRS essentially conceded the issue, making it possible to 
compensate entrepreneurs with partnership equity taxed as capital gain.117
QSBS Subsidy for Entrepreneurs.  The C Corp Structure does retain one 
significant advantage over the Passthrough Structure with respect to equity grants, 
however:  the QSBS subsidy.  As noted above, under § 1202 the owners of qualified 
small business stock pay tax on capital gains at a reduced rate of 14% subject to certain 
conditions, including a five year holding period.  If the Passthrough Structure is used, the 
LLC would likely be incorporated less than five years before the entrepreneur sells her 
shares, and the usual 20% capital gains rate would apply.  While this increase from a 14% 
to 20% tax rate is relatively minor compared to the valuation of the deal as a whole, it is 
enough to give entrepreneurs a reason to prefer the traditional C Corp Structure.  The 
2003 change in the capital gains rate to 15% makes section 1202 less important but many 
entrepreneurs are repeat players, quickly starting a new business as soon as they sell an 
old one.  To the extent proceeds from the sale of one business are reinvested in a new 
QSB, section 1045 would apply, reducing the effective tax rate below the 15% that would 
otherwise apply.
116
 Absent a § 83(b) election, an employee who receives property in exchange for services must normally 
pay income tax on the appreciation of the property at ordinary income rates.  Section 83 principles dictate 
that the grant of the profits interest goes untaxed, as the profits interest cannot be easily valued at the time 
of grant.  In 2001 the IRS issued a Rev. Proc. stating that employees who receive a profits interest do not 
need to file a protective § 83(b) election, provided that certain conditions apply.  See Rev. Proc. 2001-43.  
Therefore, it is possible to compensate entrepreneurs with profits interests in a way that maintains favorable 
capital gains treatment.
One could even argue that the partnership form is superior, since the favorable treatment under § 
83(b) requires an aggressively low valuation of the common stock at the time of the election, whereas the 
IRS has conceded that profits interests may be valued at zero under normal circumstances. See Gilson & 
Schizer, supra note 32.   On the other hand, given the IRS’s practice of not challenging valuations of 
common stock in this context, I question whether the partnership form has any advantages.  In any event, I 
do think that whatever minimal advantage is gained on the valuation question is more than offset by the 
increased complexity of partnership profits interests.
117
 See Rev. Proc. 2001-43.
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Employee/Partner Issues.  The C Corp Structure is also advantageous regarding 
other tax consequences for employees of the startup.  In the Passthrough Structure, each 
employee of the startup who receives an equity stake becomes a partner for tax purposes.  
Partner status creates several administrative burdens.  To start with the mundane, 
employee/partners would have to be provided with K-1 forms to help them report income 
at the federal and (perhaps multi-) state level, creating an administrative headache for 
both employees and for company bookkeepers.  As a result of the K-1s, employees would 
gain access to financial information which top management may not want disclosed.  
Salary payments to partner/employees can also complicate the administration of capital 
accounts.118  More substantively, employees who are treated as partners would have to 
pay an additional self-employment tax on salary, would lose full deductibility of health 
insurance premiums paid on their behalf, and may also suffer negative state income tax 
consequences.119  If the startup does turn a profit, employee/partners will have to report 
their allocable share of that profit as taxable income, even if the startup has not 
distributed out cash which the employees can use to pay the tax.120  Finally, the 
Passthrough Structure also complicates both the book and tax treatment of capital 
accounts as between the partners and the employees, particularly if different partners 
invest at different times.121  Any time a new partnership profits interest is issued, the 
partnership must “book up” the capital accounts to ensure that entering employees only 
participate in the subsequent appreciation of asset values.122
118
 Amounts paid to employees would normally be treated as guaranteed payments to a partner under § 
707(c), but might also be characterized as allocative distributions of partnership income. The Passthrough 
Structure also creates a risk that the IRS might recharacterize salary payments to non-partner/employees as 
payments to “disguised” partners, particularly if salary amounts are contingent on the performance of the 
company.
119
 See § 1401 et seq.  The self-employment tax is the equivalent of a payroll tax on corporate employees; 
to make matters worse, however, LLC members must pay tax of 15.3% of their total distributive share, 
including profits as well as guaranteed payments (i.e. salary), subject to the usual cap on social security 
contributions.  Corporate employees, on the other hand, only pay tax on salary, not other distributions.  
LLC members receive a 60% deduction for health insurance premiums, while corporations receive a 100% 
deduction.
120
 See § 704.
121
 See New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report on the Taxation of Partnership Options and 
Convertible Securities, 2002 TNT 21-24, at pin (2002) (hereinafter NYSBA Report).
122
 Tax lawyers have begun to tinker with the Passthrough Structure to ameliorate the employee/partner 
problem.  For example, a startup might create a special subsidiary to act as a management company.  The 
founders and managers would still receive profits interests, making them partners in the partnership.  But 
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Partnership Options.  The C Corp Structure is superior with respect to another 
compensation issue:  options.  A venture capital startup using the C Corp Structure 
typically creates an option pool to entice talented employees and reduce the amount of 
cash compensation necessary to hire competitively. It is generally assumed that 
partnership options are taxed much the same as stock options, but there is little authority 
and much uncertainty surrounding this area.123
The granting of a partnership option is relatively unproblematic, as it is accepted 
that the grant of the option is not a taxable event to either the entrepreneur or the 
partnership, unless the option has a “readily ascertainable fair market value” when 
granted, which will not normally be the case.124  It is possible, however, that merely 
granting a partnership option makes the holder a partner for tax purposes, leading to the 
administrative nuisances described above.125
There are additional complications when the employee exercises the option.  If 
the option gives the holder the right to acquire a profits interest, it unclear what amount, 
if any, is taxable at exercise.126  If the option gives the holder the right to acquire a capital 
interest, then it is clear that some amount should be taxable at exercise, but it is unclear 
how this amount should be measured.127  Moreover, assuming some amount is taxable to 
the holder, then the partnership should receive a deduction, but it is unclear how the 
instead of being employed by the partnership directly, the partnership would create a C Corporation to act 
as a management company, and the founders and managers would become employees of the management 
company, receiving salary and benefits just like other employees.  The management company would be 
reimbursed for salary payments on a cost-plus basis.  While this solution solves some of the 
employee/partner problems, it is not a silver bullet; every layer of organization adds to the filing fees and 
legal and accounting overhead of the business, and the C Corp Structure is still easier to understand and 
implement.
123
 See IRS Notice 2000-29, 2000-23 I.R.B. 1241 (requesting public comment on treatment of partnership 
options); NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at text accompanying note 3.
124
 See Treas. Reg § 1.83-7.
125
 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1181.
126
 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1201.  Under general § 83 principles, the holder should be taxed 
on the difference between the true fair market value and the amount of the exercise price plus any option 
premium paid.  Under Subchapter K principles, however, a liquidation analysis would be used, normally 
resulting in zero value for a profits interest and a lower value for a capital interest.
127
 A liquidation analysis would likely result in a low valuation if the VC Fund retains rights to get 
allocations first that reflect a liquidation preference.  
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deduction may be allocated among the various existing and incoming partners.128  It is 
also unclear whether the exercise is a taxable event to the historic partners as a deemed 
sale of a portion of partnership assets to the incoming partner.129  As the assets of the 
startup will have appreciated in value at the time of the exercise, the historic partners risk 
accelerating a tax bill at a time when they are unlikely to have cash with which to pay the 
tax.  Finally, it is also worth noting that partnership options make it more difficult to 
maintain proper capital accounts.130
Partnership options may also have “bad” accounting treatment, meaning that it 
may be necessary for companies to treat partnership options as a current expense on the 
income statement, thereby depressing reported earnings.  Most companies today do not 
treat stock options as a current expense of the company, taking no charge against 
earnings when stock options are granted.  The current accounting rules, found in 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 (APB 25) and Financial Accounting 
Standards Board No. 123 (FASB 123) address stock-based equity interests.  The 
treatment of partnership options, however, is not specified.131  The National Venture 
Capital Association and other lobbying groups have been fighting hard to protect the 
existing accounting treatment of stock options, which many observers and legislators feel 
is unjustified.132  The ultimate outcome of that legislative battle is unknown.  In the 
meantime, venture capital professionals are unlikely to want to open up a new battlefront 
over the accounting treatment of partnership options.
Finally, the complexity of drafting partnership options cannot be dismissed.  
Although the theory is relatively simple for those familiar with partnership tax principles, 
128
 To avoid negative tax consequences to the incoming partner, some partnerships will make a special 
allocation of the entire partnership deduction to the incoming partner, thereby completely offsetting the 
incoming partner’s tax liability.  It is questionable whether this strategy conforms with the § 704(b) 
regulations.  
129
 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at text accompanying note 4.
130
 See NYSBA Report, supra note 115, at 1206.
131
 See Joseph E. Bachelder, Equity Participation by Executives in Main Street/Dot Com Ventures, 1213 
PLI / Corp 67, 73 (2000) (stating that FASB 123 applies to options to acquire capital interests, but that 
treatment of options to acquire profits interests is unclear).  Arguably, the same standards apply to options 
to acquire capital interests in a partnership or even profits interests in the partnership.  But given that FASB 
123 is under attack in the wake of the Enron scandal, accountants may not be as willing to be aggressive. 
132
 See http://www.nvca.com  (describing Senate testimony of NVCA president) (site last visited August 
28, 2002).
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the mechanics are difficult.  In particular, the flexibility and variability of partnership 
agreements with regard to the allocation of income and loss and the maintenance of 
capital accounts makes the drafting extremely tricky.  As one practitioner has explained, 
Drafting an option on a partnership interest is a complex task and is 
normally much more difficult than drafting an option on a share of 
common stock in the corporate context. It requires an understanding of the 
parties' economic deal, the partnership's allocation, distribution and capital 
account mechanics and the interaction of those mechanics with the 
purchase of a partnership interest on exercise of the option (including, e.g., 
the initial capital account to be given to [the service partner] on exercise of 
the option and the impact of writing up (or not writing up) capital accounts 
on option exercise).133
This complexity not only increases legal costs, it could make it more difficult to 
attract talented employees.  Unlike executives of public companies, startup 
employees often do not retain counsel, instead relying on the company to explain 
the employment compensation package.  Employees may be suspicious of the 
more complicated nature of partnership options and discount the value of the 
proposed compensation package accordingly.
B.  Corporate Governance and Drafting
Corporate law differences between a closely-held corporation and a limited 
liability company are generally thought to be insignificant.134  In practice, however, there 
is enough uncertainty about how corporate governance provisions will be applied, and 
there are enough difficult drafting issues, so that even today clients are sometimes wary 
about using a non-corporate entity.  LLCs are somewhat new: although the first LLC 
statute was passed in 1977, they did not become commonplace until the 1990s.135  As a 
133
 William R. Welke & Olga A. Loy, Compensating the Service Partner with Partnership Equity: Code §83 
and Other Issues, 493 PLI/Tax 625, 683-84.
134
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1749.
135
 Before 1996, private companies had to pass a cumbersome four-factor test to qualify as partnerships for 
tax purposes.  Although tax lawyers became quite adept at drafting the necessary language, it was not until 
the Check-the-Box regulations were issued that partnership tax treatment became a simple matter of 
literally checking a box on an IRS form.  See Victor Fleischer, If it Looks Like a Duck:  Corporate 
Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 518, 519 (describing 
elective features of Check-the-Box). 
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result, there is little case law outlining the rights and obligations of LLC members.136  In 
general, LLCs offer flexibility with respect to management of the company, the rights 
and obligations from one member to another, and disclosure obligations.  Some states, 
including Delaware, even permit members to waive fiduciary duties.137  Flexibility brings 
uncertainty, both in terms of determining what rights LLC agreements confer and 
whether the agreements will be enforceable in court. 
Uncertainty creates a significant information cost.  When a startup is organized as 
a corporation, it is easy for the parties to understand and value their rights and 
obligations.  For example, when the VC Fund in the C Corp Structure receives preferred 
stock, it is understood, without even looking at the charter, that no dividend may be paid 
to the common stockholders so long as the preferred’s dividend is outstanding, and if the 
startup is liquidated, the VC Fund will receive all of the proceeds until its liquidation 
preference is satisfied.138  Under the Passthrough Structure, on the other hand, there are 
no such limitations on distributions until the parties agree to them in the LLC operating 
agreement.  A “capital interest” in an LLC has no meaning other than what the parties 
assign to it.139  Another example is fiduciary duty:  under the C Corp Structure venture 
capital fund managers who sit on the board of the startup have a fiduciary duty of care 
and duty of loyalty to the startup’s founders and managers.140  If an LLC is used, it is 
unclear what duties, if any, the VCs owe to the founders and managers; a VC director 
may be free to divert corporate opportunities away from the LLC startup to other 
portfolio companies.  To ensure that the founders and managers of the startup are 
protected, the startup’s lawyers have to draft appropriate protections in the LLC operating 
136
 See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should 
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Corporate Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and 
Securities Regulation for the Limited Liability Company, 51 Okla. L Rev. 427, 454-68 (1998).
137
 See Wayne N. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain 
Role, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 135, 174 (1995).
138
 See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 170.
139
 See Del. LLC Act §§ 18-504, 18-804.
140
 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkam: Insights about C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and 
the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 Northwestern L. Rev. 607 (2002).
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agreement.  Other commentators have noted that the lack of well-established practices 
and default rules for LLCs increases transaction costs in the venture capital context.141
Granted, these differences in corporate governance are relatively minor 
and can be addressed in the drafting process.  Moreover, parties might be more 
concerned with their reputation than with their legal rights and obligations.142
Indeed, in recent years, outside the context of VC-managed funds, deal planners 
have developed a hybrid structure that uses both an LLC and a corporation.143
Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the LLC form increases legal costs and is an 
unwelcome addition to a negotiating atmosphere already laden with uncertainty 
and distrust.  In particular, entrepreneurs who are accustomed to running 
corporations might resist trying out a new and unfamiliar entity.  For startups that 
hope to incorporate within a few years anyway, adding an extra layer of legal 
costs, complexity, and uncertainty is unappealing, creating another reason why 
entrepreneurs and venture capital professionals prefer the C Corp Structure.
141
 Professor Deborah DeMott has observed that LLCs do not normally differentiate between managing and 
monitoring, the latter being the VCs’ typical role in the C Corp Structure.  See Deborah A. DeMott, 
Agency and the Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on Design on the Same Plane of Interest, 54 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 595, 608 (discussing Bankman’s puzzle and noting that “[c]onsiderable ingenuity could be 
expended on attempts to replicate the governance structure created by corporate law in an unincorporated 
firm in order to place the venture capitalist in an authoritative and informed position to monitor 
management and to intervene when warranted without itself undertaking the burdens – and liabilities – of 
direct operational management. A differentiated monitoring function is not an expressly stated option for 
the structures created under partnership statutes and under most LLC statutes.”)  See also Callison, supra 
note 15.  
142
 See generally D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. Small & 
Emerging Bus. L. 133, 156-170 (1998) (describing role of reputation in venture capital industry).
143
  The emergence of the hybrid structure suggests that path dependence is not a very strong explanation 
for current behavior.  As Professor Bankman explained, there is a collective action problem in that the 
switching costs might outweigh the benefits for any particular firm. See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, 
supra note 3, at 1768.   See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or, “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997). 
In recent years, however, corporate investors have used a hybrid structure called, not very 
creatively, the “Barnes and Noble dot com Structure.”  In the B&N.com structure, a corporate parent (or 
two) creates a special purpose subsidiary that becomes the managing member of an LLC.  Another 
corporation is created as an IPO vehicle and becomes the other member of the LLC.  Through a high-vote / 
low-vote structure, the corporate investor can maintain control over the startup and enjoy the passthrough 
of tax losses; the IPO vehicle facilitates exit strategy.  The development of the hybrid structure shows that 
where the tax losses are truly valuable – i.e., when most of the money invested in the startup comes from a 
corporate taxable investor – deal planners can overcome the path dependence problem and use a different 
structure.
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C.  Smoother Exit Strategy
Corporate governance and employee compensation issues make the C Corp 
Structure advantageous for creating and running a startup.  It is also vital to examine exit 
strategy, where – in most cases – it is also easier for investors to sell their stake in a 
venture capital startup if it has been structured as a corporation from the beginning.144
Of course, partnerships and LLCs may legally convert into corporations, and 
often do.  The incorporation process is not as easy as it might seem, however, particularly 
when a sale or reorganization is close at hand. 145  Professor Bankman notes that the 
transition from partnership to corporation is expensive, costing perhaps $200,000 in 
additional legal fees.146  Bankman correctly argues, however, that the transaction costs 
cannot fully explain the structuring choice, as the conversion costs amount to only a 
small percentage of the value of the tax deductions lost.147
144
  See D. Gordon Smith, Control over Exit in Venture Capital Relationships 5 (2001) (available on 
ssrn.com); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior and Venture Survival: A Theory of 
Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 Wisc. L. Rev. 45, 68 (describing VC control over exit).
It is tempting to tell a signaling story here.  In a 1997 symposium, Professor Ian Ayres raised 
signaling as a possible explanation for the choice of organizational structure.  See Ian Ayres, Never 
Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev. 503, 517 (discussing importance of 
sociological explanations for irrational economic behavior and raising possibility that “Bankman does not 
adequately consider how the choice to incorporate might be a way for managers to signal to venture 
capitalists a higher likelihood that the firm will succeed.”) [ ].  Organizing as a corporation focuses 
attention on gains, not losses.  Exit strategy might be an especially important area to signal, as organizing 
as a corporation could signal that an IPO or acquisition is the preferred exit.  In other words – to continue 
the baseball metaphor – organizing as a corporation sends a positive signal, like Babe Ruth’s pointing his 
bat at the right field bleachers.  Organizing as a partnership, on the other hand, would send a negative 
signal, like squaring around to lay down a bunt.  
The signaling story works, however, only if the signal (the choice of organizational form) is 
expensive to send, so that only high quality firms can send the signal.  Here, both good and bad firms send 
the signal, creating a pooling equilibrium rather than a separating equilibrium.  See Douglas G. Baird et al., 
Game Theory and the Law 83 (1994).   Thus, there may be some stigma associated with choosing the 
partnership form (as it shows possible disregard for the importance of keeping organizational expenses 
low), but the existence of the hybrid structure, supra note --, suggests that whatever negative signal is sent 
is easy to overcome.
145
 But cf. John M. Cunningham, The Limited Liability Company: Entity of Choice for High-Tech Start-
Ups?, 13 Computer Law. 11, 17 (1996) (recommending LLC if likely exit is asset sale, C Corp if likely exit 
is stock sale, arguing that IPO exit is irrelevant because incorporation process is “manageable”). 
146
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1750.
147
 See Bankman, Silicon Valley Startups, supra note 3, at 1750.
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But neither should one dismiss the complexity of conversion right before exit.  A 
successful exit is always possible, but exiting is simpler and cheaper if the startup has 
been organized as a corporation from the outset.  Incorporating a business just before 
selling or going public can cause unwanted delays.  It requires management to face 
further complicating an already cumbersome process at the most sensitive time for a 
startup – when it has finally turned the corner and may be sold to a third party or shopped 
to investment bankers for a potential IPO.  Specifically, incorporation introduces an 
opportunity for holdup, as each manager will be asked to exchange her partnership 
interest (or option) for stock or options in the new entity.  Because the enthusiastic 
participation of management is essential to a successful road show, managers may be in a 
position to extract additional value from the company at this sensitive time.  This could 
happen, even if management continues to hold shares in the same company.  But by 
forcing management into an exchange, incorporation encourages managers to engage 
their attorneys and renegotiate their own personal deals with the company.      
Complicating the IPO Process.  Initial public offerings hold a sanctified status in 
the world of startups.148  The IPO market has cooled off in recent years.  Successful 
startups are now more likely to be acquired by a trade buyer than to go public.149  But the 
148
 IPOs even attained status in pop culture, generating buzz in Silicon Valley in California, “Silicon Alley” 
in New York, and other high-tech corridors in Austin, Route 128 outside Boston, Northern Virginia, and 
Atlanta.  See, e.g., [cite to newspaper articles].  Going public became an end in and of itself for many 
startups that pushed perhaps too rapidly during the tech bubble of 1998-200.  See DOT CON (describing 
rapid growth of Kozmo.com); STARTUP.COM (describing rapid growth of govWorks.com).
When venture capital funds list their successful investments, they highlight companies that have 
gone public and become a household name.  See, e.g., Kleiner Perkins website (http://www.kpcb.com/) 
(listing AOL, Amazon, Sun, Genentech, Compaq, Juniper); Accel Partners website 
(http://www.accel.com/home.asp) (listing Real Networks, Veritas, UUNet, Foundry, AMCC, Agile 
Software, and Macromedia).  The frequency with which a venture capital fund’s portfolio companies go 
public is a central measure of the VC’s reputation in the eyes of LP investors.  See Bernard S. Black & 
Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets , 47 J. 
Fin. Econ pin (1997). Taking a company public can benefit a VC’s reputation to such an extent that some 
VCs (especially at less established VC firms) are willing to sacrifice value in order to complete a public 
offering and thereby improve their name-recognition, even at the expense of other stakeholders.  See Paul 
A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 133 (1996). 
Indeed, the lure of the IPO is sometimes stronger than it should be; VCs tend to take companies 
public prematurely when the fund nears the end of its ten-year life. See Gompers & Lerner, Venture Capital 
Cycle, supra note 32, ch. 12.  Gompers & Lerner also find that younger less-established VC firms take 
companies public sooner than well-established VC firms, and that IPO underpricing is more likely to occur.  
Id.  See also Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital 
Contracting, at 13 (2001) (working paper, available on ssrn.com).
149
 See supra note 45.
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availability of a public stock market is critical to the existence of a venture capital 
industry.150  Public offerings provide liquidity for venture capital investors at often 
generous valuations.  Moreover, the availability of an IPO exit allows VCs to enter into 
an implicit contract with entrepreneurs concerning the future control of the startup: 
control which is carefully allocated between the VCs and the entrepreneurs passes back 
to the entrepreneur when the VCs exit.151  In effect, IPO potential gives entrepreneurs a 
call option on control exercisable in the event of great success. 
Deal structures that potentially complicate the IPO process are frowned upon.152
At first glance it would appear to be quite easy to incorporate quickly in advance of a 
possible IPO.  The corporate filings are cheap and basically simple.  The mechanics of 
the process can make conversion tricky, however, since different methods produce 
different tax consequences.153
150
 See Black & Gilson, supra note 140, at pin (“We argue that a well developed stock market that permits 
venture capitalists to exit through an initial public offering (IPO) is critical to the existence of a vibrant 
venture capital market.”).  See also Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Extent of Venture 
Capital Exits: Evidence from Canada and the United States (2002) (available on ssrn.com); Armin 
Schweinbacher, An Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Europe and the United States (2002) (available on 
ssrn.com).
151
 Black & Gilson, supra note 140, at 22. See also Bratton, supra note 32, at pin (describing importance of 
shared control mechanism).
152
 See Michael R. Darby & Lynn G. Zucker, Going Public When You Can in Biotechnology (2002)  
(Working Paper on file with author) (noting desire of biotech firms to go public when IPO market is open, 
not just when science base is sufficient). 
153 There are three options for incorporating a partnership or LLC, each of which attains the same goal of 
creating a corporate entity that can sell shares to the public in an IPO.  See generally Rev. Rul. 84-111 
(recognizing different tax consequences depending on method used).  The first option is to have the 
partnership contribute the assets to a newly formed corporation (Newco) in exchange for 100% of Newco’s 
common stock.  Newco then sells newly-issued shares of common stock to the public, thereby splitting the 
ownership between the partnership and the public.  Sometime after the IPO the partnership would liquidate, 
distributing the Newco stock upstream to the VC Fund and the managers and founders of the startup.  The 
VC Fund could then sell shares to the public in a secondary offering or distribute the shares to the LP 
investors.  
The second option is to have the VC fund and the startup’s management contribute their 
partnership interests to Newco in exchange for common stock.  The Newco stock would be allocated 
between the Fund and management according to the original partnership agreement.  Newco would then 
own 100% of the partnership.  The partnership would automatically be liquidated, and Newco would then 
own the assets of the partnership directly.  Newco would then sell shares to the public in an IPO, and the 
Fund, now holding marketable shares, could follow suit in a secondary offering.  
The third option begins with a momentary liquidation of the business.  The partnership would 
liquidate, distributing its assets upstream to the VC fund and the startup’s management as outlined in the 
partnership agreement.  The VC fund and management would then immediately contribute those assets to 
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Incorporating before an IPO can also create a securities law issue for LP 
investors, particularly if the startup was not meticulously advised by legal counsel when 
it was first organized.  Under Rule 144, the SEC requires selling shareholders in a private 
company to hold securities for at least one year prior to sale.  The holding period of LLC 
or partnership interests normally does not tack to the corporate stock received in the 
exchange.  This holding period rule potentially delays the exit of the VC Fund by up to 
one year – six months or nine months longer than underwriters normally require.  
Sophisticated lawyers may be able to structure around this SEC Rule:  commentators 
have noted that if the original LLC operating agreement provides that the entity will 
incorporate in connection with an IPO, that no additional consideration will be paid by 
investors in connection with the incorporation, and that the incorporation will cause no 
shift in the holders’ economic interests not contemplated by the original documents, then 
the Rule 144 restriction should not apply.154  So long as the entire IPO process – from the 
exchange of partnership interests for convertible preferred stock followed by conversion 
to common followed by sale to the public – was contemplated and outlined in the original 
documents, the SEC rule should not prove to be too high a hurdle for selling 
shareholders.  It does, however, require some additional planning, adding yet again to the 
transaction costs of the Passthrough Structure.
Incorporating on the eve of an IPO can also create tax problems if the VC Fund or 
other shareholders plan to sell a significant stake of the business to the public in the IPO, 
although underwriters usually prevent such sales from happening.  From a tax 
Newco in exchange for common stock.  Newco could then sell shares to the public in an IPO, and the Fund 
could follow with a secondary offering.
Valuation problems probably make option one the most attractive.  The VC Fund typically holds a 
large liquidation preference which drops away upon completion of a “qualified IPO.”  The liquidation 
preference gives the startup’s founders and managers a strong incentive to build the business rapidly and 
successfully.  Under options two and three, however, even if an IPO were in sight, the partnership would be 
liquidated before the completion of the qualified IPO, and the founders and managers would effectively be 
punished instead of rewarded.  The first option – liquidating the partnership after the IPO – solves the 
valuation problem by leaving the liquidation preference in place until after the IPO.  The partnership 
remains intact as the majority shareholder of Newco.  One possible drawback is an information cost 
problem for IPO investors:  IPO investors might be concerned that 75% of the shares of Newco would 
continue to be held by a single entity (the partnership), and presumably would want to understand how the 
partnership’s internal governance works.  
154
 See Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions § 
903.4 (1998).  
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perspective, the concern is the control requirement of § 351.155  Section 351 allows 
shareholders to contribute property to a corporation which they control in exchange for 
stock without realizing any gain on the appreciation in the value of the property.156  For 
an exchange to qualify as a good § 351 transaction, the contributors of the property must 
remain in control of the new corporation immediately after the exchange.157  The issue is 
what is meant by the language “immediately after.”  A literal interpretation of the Code 
suggests that there is no problem, as the incorporation would take place at least a few 
days before the IPO.  Under the step-transaction doctrine, however, the IRS or the courts 
may determine the tax consequences of a transaction completed through a series of 
integrated steps by looking at the steps taken together, not by evaluating each step 
separately.  Case law in this area is generally taxpayer-favorable, indicating that absent a 
“binding commitment” to sell shares at the time of incorporation, then incorporation will 
be viewed as an independent § 351 transaction.158  By the time selling shareholders have 
a binding commitment, the incorporation will be “old and cold.”  
155
 See generally Jeffrey T. Sheffield & Christian E. Kimball, Organizing the Corporate Venture, 465 PLI 
Tax 287 § 5 (2000) (describing case law and rulings pertaining to control “immediately after” the 
exchange); Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and other Transactions 
under Section 351, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 349 (1991) (arguing for flexible interpretation of 80% control 
requirement and limited application of step transaction doctrine). 
156
 Upon incorporation, the partnership would contribute property to Newco in exchange for 100% of the 
common stock.  The property contributed would be the assets of the business:  intellectual property, 
equipment, goodwill, and so on.  These assets are likely to have a low basis and a high fair market value, 
creating a high potential tax bill.  If the contribution qualifies under § 351, however, no current tax will be 
owed, and the partnership would take a substitute basis in Newco stock equal to its basis in the contributed 
assets. See § 358(a). If the contribution does not qualify under § 351, then the partnership would recognize 
income equal to the fair market value over the basis of the assets, and the income would be allocated 
between the Fund and management according to the partnership agreement. See § 1001 (sale or exchange). 
If the 351 transaction is not treated as a nonrecognition event, then the consequences are quite punitive.  
The partnership’s contribution of assets to the corporation would be a taxable exchange, and the partners 
would have to recognize gain to the extent that the fair market value of the stock received in the exchange 
exceeds the partnership’s (low) inside basis in the assets.  
157
 See § 351(a). “Control” in this context is defined by § 368(c), which defines control as “ownership of 
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to 
vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.”  
See § 368(c).
158
 The three usual formulations of the step transaction doctrine are the “end result” test, the “mutual 
interdependence” test, and the “binding commitment” test.  See generally McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing formulations).  Most courts have 
found the binding commitment test to be overly narrow.  See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, 
Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 12.61[3], at 12-210 (6th ed. 1997) (noting 
that binding commitment test "may be reserved for situations where the taxpayer, rather than the 
government, is seeking to invoke the [step transaction] doctrine").  
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An issue arises, however, when public investors buy preexisting shares of Newco 
from the VC Fund in the initial public offering or in a secondary offering.  Because the 
public investors do not contribute cash or property to Newco, it cannot be argued that 
they form part of the control group.  If at the time of incorporation there is a binding 
commitment to sell between a transferor and a third party who is not part of the original 
control group, then the transaction will not qualify under § 351.159  Where there is an 
intention to sell but no binding commitment, the law is less clear.160  Normally, 
underwriters will require insiders to agree to a lockup provision, requiring them to hold 
on to their shares for 3 months or longer following the IPO.  Given this lockup 
For primary offerings of shares by the company to the public, the step transaction doctrine is not 
an issue, as the partnership may count the public investors as part of the 80% control group required by § 
351.  A Treasury regulation provides that in the case of a “qualified underwriting transaction” persons who 
acquire stock from an underwriter are treated as if they acquired stock directly from the company, 
regardless of whether the underwriting takes place on a best efforts basis (where the underwriter merely 
acts as an agent for the corporation) or a firm commitment basis (where the underwriter buys the stock 
from the company and immediately resells to the public). See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(3). This works if the 
investors are buying newly-issued shares, as they would be contributing property in exchange for Newco 
stock.
Complicating the issue somewhat is the shift of ownership which often follows soon after an IPO. 
The shift of significant control over non-operational matters from the insiders (the startup’s founders and 
management and the VC fund) to the public is the a principal purpose for the incorporation and the change 
in organizational structure; to say that the incorporation is a truly separate transaction from the IPO and 
secondary offerings which follow elevates form over substance in a way that may be inconsistent with the 
way the step transaction doctrine is generally applied. See Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free 
Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 341 (1991) (noting that binding 
commitment formulation seems to apply only in the case of 351 transactions and D reorgs).  As explained 
in a leading treatise, “where the loss of control, although not pursuant to a binding obligation, is both part 
of a preconceived plan and a sine qua non thereof,” then the step transaction doctrine should apply, even in 
the context of § 351. See Bittker & Eustice at para. 3.09[2] (7th ed. 2002).   But see American Bantam Car 
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff’d per curiam 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding that three 
days delay between incorporation and IPO is sufficient to preclude step transaction doctrine); Scientific 
Instrument Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff’d per curiam, 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953) 
(holding that step transaction doctrine did not apply where sale to the public was intended but was not 
consummated until six months following incorporation).
159 May Broadcasting Co., 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953); see also Intermountain Lumber Co. v. 
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1025 (1978); Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032 (1957); 
Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937).
160
 The Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that even absent a binding commitment, a plan to incorporate 
and then dispose of control is enough to run afoul of section 351, regardless of whether the parties were 
legally bound to complete the sale. Culligan Water Conditioning v. United States, 567 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 
1978). And in other contexts, the step transaction doctrine is applied to integrate steps of a transaction 
based on the “mutual interdependence” of the steps or the “end result,” either of which would suggest that 
section 351 should not apply.
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requirement, most tax lawyers are comfortable giving an opinion that the step transaction 
doctrine will not apply.161  Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains. 
Incorporating just prior to an IPO also creates an extra opportunity for conflict 
between the startup’s founders and managers and the VC Fund.  The parties will likely 
want to draft new agreements outlining their rights with respect to the IPO or other 
potential exits, especially if these agreements were not comprehensively drafted at the 
outset.  The VC Fund may ask for a registration rights agreement.162  Drag-along and tag-
along rights in the original partnership agreement might also have to be revised to reflect 
the new situation.  Planning for these issues in advance can minimize costly and time-
consuming negotiations.  However, since most startups are not willing to pay counsel 
more than a bare minimum for legal costs at the time when the startup is first organized, 
it is unrealistic to expect sophisticated planning to take place until much later in the life 
of the venture.
Incorporating on the eve of an IPO therefore raises a few issues that do not exist 
where the startup was organized as a corporation from the beginning.  Although corporate 
and tax lawyers are becoming more skilled at planning for incorporation, the extra step of 
conversion adds some cost and complexity to the process.
Tax-free Sale to a Trade Buyer.  For a C Corporation, merger with or acquisition 
by a third party is relatively painless and affords potential acquirors a fair degree of 
flexibility.  Although the transaction may take different forms, each of which has 
different requirements, most of the time the buyer can acquire the stock of the target C 
Corporation tax-free in exchange for stock of the buyer or a combination of stock and 
cash.163
Partnerships cannot take advantage of the usual reorganization provisions of § 
368.  Nor can they incorporate just before being acquired: the control requirement of § 
161
 There is a strong argument, given the other case law, that the Ninth Circuit dicta is wrong, and that 
absent a binding commitment to sell to the public in a secondary offering, the step transaction doctrine 
should not apply.  After all, a significant number of companies do poorly after an IPO, and the fund may be 
left holding shares that it cannot sell.  Similarly, management may want to dispose of shares after the IPO 
lockup expires, but its ability to do so absent a binding commitment is subject to the whims of the 
marketplace.  See O’Connor v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. 213 (1957).
162
 It would be difficult although presumably not impossible to have drafted a registration rights agreement 
in advance concerning the registration of securities that do not yet exist.  
163
 See § 368.
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351 is a significant barrier (and not just an aggravation) when a trade buyer seeks to 
acquire a partnership in a tax-free reorganization under § 368. Unlike in the IPO context, 
where case law and IRS rulings are generous to the taxpayer, in the reorganization 
context common law tax doctrines preclude a tax-free incorporation immediately before 
the merger.164
It may be possible for certain trade buyers to acquire a partnership in a tax-free 
transaction.  For example, in a § 351 acquisition structure, the buyer’s shareholders 
would contribute all of their stock in the buyer to Newco in exchange for Newco 
common stock, and the sellers would contribute their partnership interests to Newco in 
exchange for Newco common stock.  Although tax-free, the structure has a notable 
weakness:  larger trade buyers whose stock is publicly traded are not likely to want to 
undergo a major change in capital structure in order to acquire a small startup.  One 
cannot imagine Cisco, for example, asking all its shareholders to exchange their stock 
every time a new startup is acquired.  Thus, the structure really only makes sense for a 
merger of equals, which, while not unusual, is not usually the most profitable exit 
strategy.165
Taxable Sale to a Trade Buyer.  For taxable deals, the Passthrough Structure is 
somewhat more complex than the C Corp Structure but might actually be advantageous.  
Using the Passthrough Structure ensures the advantage of incurring only one level of tax.  
If the partners exit by selling their partnership interests to the buyer for cash, they will 
164
 See Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions § 
302.10 (1998). To take advantage of the traditional tax-free reorganization provisions of § 368, the 
partnership would first have to incorporate prior to the acquisition, raising a step transaction issue under § 
351.  In Revenue Ruling 70-140, a taxpayer transferred assets to a wholly owned corporation in a putative § 
351 transaction, followed by a transfer of the newly issued stock of the corporation to a buyer in a B 
reorganization.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer did not satisfy the control requirement of § 351.  Because 
the § 351 and the B reorganization occurred as part of a prearranged plan, the use of the corporate form was 
transitory and without substance, the transfer did not qualify under § 351, and the taxpayer had to pay tax 
on the incorporation as if it were a taxable sale of the assets. The taxpayer fared better in Weikel v. 
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. 432 (1986), where the Tax Court held that absent a binding commitment, and so 
long as there are valid non-tax business reasons for incorporating the business (i.e. other than to take 
advantage of the tax-free reorganization provisions), the step transaction doctrine would not apply.  
165
 In the Bigco / small LLC merger scenario, it may be possible to use the 351 structure by giving the 
sellers shares of Newco but exchangeable into shares of the parent (Bigco).  The validity of the structure 
would depend on whether such a strategy amount to a “plan” for purposes of the step-transaction doctrine.  
So if a startup were acquired by Cisco, the startups’ owners would receive shares of Newco.  The shares of 
Newco would be illiquid, but they would be exchangeable into shares of Cisco at the option of the 
shareholder.    
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pay tax on the amount realized less basis, just as with any other asset.  But the amount 
realized must be adjusted to account for the many aggregate-based rules of subchapter K, 
such as increasing the amount realized to include the discharge of the partner’s share of 
partnership liabilities.166  Complicating things further is § 751(a), which requires that 
selling partners recognize ordinary income on the sale of a partnership interest to the 
extent that the partnership has unrealized accounts receivable or inventory items.167
Alternatively, the partnership could sell its assets to the acquiror, with the 
partnership then distributing cash upstream to the various partners.  Again, the liquidating 
distribution would trigger recapture provisions and other partnership tax rules.  Unlike 
the sale of stock, which is usually a relatively simple affair with well-settled tax 
consequences, the sale of a partnership interest requires closer (and more costly) attention 
from the deal lawyers.168
But an asset sale from a partnership has the distinct advantage of giving the buyer 
a step up in basis in the target’s assets without incurring an extra layer of tax.  In order to 
get a step up in basis using the C Corp Structure, the startup must sell its assets to the 
buyer.  The startup then recognizes income on the sale of the assets.  Although the 
startup’s NOL will help offset this tax liability, any additional appreciation will be taxed 
at the corporate rate of 35%.  To get the cash to the shareholders, the startup must then 
undergo a liquidating distribution, which is taxable to shareholders under § 331.  In 
contrast, if the Passthrough Structure is used, the asset sale will trigger one level of tax. 
Each partner recognizes its pro rata share of the partnership’s income from the sale, but 
the liquidating distribution by a partnership is not taxable to the partners.
In sum, organizing a startup as a partnership or LLC is a great challenge for a 
smart lawyer but unappealing for clients who hope to minimize legal costs.  With careful 
planning, the Passthrough Structure achieves many of the same goals regarding creating, 
running, and exiting a startup company, and it is advantageous if the preferred exit is a 
taxable asset sale to a trade buyer.  But the Passthrough Structure is costly and complex, 
166
 See § 741.
167
 See § 751(a).
168
 See generally Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to Praise It, 54 Tax Lawyer 451 
(2001).
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and venture capital investors do not value the much-vaunted flexibility of the LLC form.  
It is not surprising, then, to see that entrepreneurs and VCs stick with the devil they 
know.
V.  CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the seemingly irrational decision to organize a startup 
as a corporation is, in fact, quite rational.  The key factors are the limited ability of 
investors to use tax losses, agency costs, the tax treatment of gains, and the complexity of 
the Passthrough Structure.  This Article has also demonstrated the value of avoiding the 
behavioral phenomena of optimism bias as a simple explanation for seemingly irrational 
behavior – at least in the context of sophisticated investors with a great deal of money at 
stake.  Optimism plays a role, to be sure, but it is not the wild-eyed optimism of a naïve 
entrepreneur.  Rather, the VCs’ rational emphasis on the tax treatment of gains, not 
losses, and the various tax and nontax advantages of the corporate form make the 
corporation the preferred vehicle for financing a venture capital startup.  And so tax 
plumbing ends up providing a workable, if inelegant, solution to this wonderful puzzle.
